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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the thesis of Atsuo Hirano for the Master of

Arts in History presented February 14, 1996.

Title: The Japanese Approach to the End of the Pacific War.

Before World War II ended with the Japanese surrender
to the Allied Nations on August 15, 1945, the United States
dropped the atomic bomb on a Japanese city of Hiroshima.
For fifty years, the question of whether the atomic bomb was
necessary to end the war has been discussed by historians
and journalists.
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the Japanese
situation in the spring and summer of 1945 by reading the
statements and ideas of the Japanese Emperor, government
officials and military officers at the time.
Since the Japanese Emperor was believed to have played
a significant role in ending the war, it is necessary to
examine his power and the nature of his decision making.
Also, the Japanese Army still wielded significant
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influence on the Japanese government, it is indispensable to
examine what the Army men thought and said at the time.
In the final stage of the war, the Japanese leadership
came to realize that the retention of the Imperial System
would be the only demand from the Allied Nations they could
insist on.

The American leadership knew this circumstance

in Japan, and thought that the war could be ended by giving
the Japanese the assurance of retaining the Emperor.
After the May 8th German surrender, the Japanese feared
the Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

They knew that

Japan could not fight against all the world.

Also, the

Japanese feared the spread of communism through Soviet
advance toward Japan.

So the Japanese asked for the Soviet

maintenance of neutrality and mediation in the war.

Even

when the Japanese were asking for the Soviet mediation, they
had the alternative plan of asking for the direct
negotiation with the United States in case the Soviet route
was to be closed.
Through considering all these factors, it is concluded
that in the summer of 1945 the Japanese were unable to
continue the war and were seeking a way to end the war.
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INTRODUCTION

From the autumn of 1994 to the spring of 1995, the
exhibition of the historical artifacts of the atomic bombing
of Hiroshima at the Smithonian Institute in Washington D.C.
became controversial in America.

Among the several points

in the dispute, the opponents of the exhibition pointed out
that the original guidebook favored the Japanese side too
much in the explanation of the Japanese war situation,
depicting the Japanese as victims and the Americans as
attackers.

On the whole, the argument of each side did not

necessarily clarify the Japanese situation at that time.
Also, in the summer of 1995, around the time of the
50th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, major American TV
networks broadcast documentary and discussion programs
concerning the atomic bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It

opened a wide debate on the question of whether or not the
atomic bombing was necessary to end the war with Japan.
During the debates, the participants in the programs voiced
rather stereotyped views of the Japanese in the spring and
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summer of 1945.
The purpose of my thesis is to clarify the Japanese
situation before the end of World War II by looking at some
Japanese sources to contribute to the discussion of whether
or not the atomic bomb was necessary to end the war in the
Pacific and Asia.
Since the Japanese Emperor was the central figure in
the process of ending the war, it is necessary to clarify
the background and nature of his involvement in the war, and
to ask the question of why he continued the war.

Until his

death in 1989, the Emperor Hirohito was a mysterious person.
Many Japanese and Americans called him like-a-God figure.
It is necessary to get rid of this veil and study his real
role in the war.

Especially, it is crucial to see his

relation to the Japanese Army.

He did not necessarily have

complete control of his Army before and during the war, and
this factor contributed to his delayed decision to end the
war.
In America, many people still believe that the atomic
bomb ended the war.

As factors for bringing the war to its

end, three years and nine months of severe battles in the
Pacific island were far more important.

Also, in the summer

3

of 1945, American air raids and naval blockade had already
brought the Japanese war efforts to near bankruptcy.

Social

chaos from the starvation of people was imminent.
Continuously engaging in the war was to become impossible
due to the scarcity of materials.
When the Japanese were suffering from devastation and
near starvation in the war with the United States and other
Allied nations, and the war was in the final leg in early
August of 1945, the Soviet entry into the war was considered
as a decisive blow to the Japanese.

The Japanese Army had

wanted to end the war by Soviet mediation without losing
face and to end the war on favorable terms.
Observing the def eat in Okinawa and the surrender of
Germany, more Japanese came to realize that the defeat of
Japan was inevitable, and that the battle on the Japanese
homeland would bring forth tremendous disaster and chaos to
Japan and an end to the imperial system.

Contrary to the

ostentatious cry of the Army men for the battle on the
homeland, very poor defense conditions began to be exposed
to the Emperor, government officials, and to the people.
Facing the realities of the war, the morale of the people,
as well as of many soldiers, was deteriorating.

4

In the American preparation for the Potsdam Conference,
the article for the retention of the Emperor was deleted
right before the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, by
Secretary of State James Byrnes.

As predicted by Secretary

of War Stimson, the Japanese did not immediately accept it.
After the atomic bombing and the Soviet entry into the
Japanese war, the assurance that the Emperor would be
retained made the Japanese finally decide to surrender.
For bringing the war to its end, not a single factor
was decisive, but rather many persons and many events
gradually changed the situation in the direction to the end
of the war by interacting and influencing each other.

CHAPTER I

THE EMPEROR CONTINUED THE WAR

Emperor's War Responsibility

The Japanese Emperor Hirohito, now called Showa Tenno,
approved the Japanese entry into the Pacific War with the
United States and Great Britain in November 1941.

He di-

rected the war actively, and encouraged his soldiers in the
reckless war in the Pacific, and in Asia.

The Japanese

government and military authority told the soldiers that to
die for the Emperor was an honorable thing.

Actually, about

three million of Japanese soldiers and civilians died in the
war, and a far greater number of people in Asia and in the
Pacific became the victims in the war.

Considering the fact

that the Japanese fought the war in the name of the Emperor
and many people became victims because of this, the question
of whether the Emperor was responsible for the war sounds
strange.

However, this question has been asked for fifty

years since the war.

As Herbert P. Bix points out in his

article, "Hiroshima in History and Memory: Japan's

6

Delayed Surrender: A Reinterpretation," the ambiguous explanation of the Emperor's role in the war was caused by his
minister's strenuous efforts to make him immune to the accusation of responsibility for the war and the United States
government's and General Douglas MacArthur's policy to use
the Emperor for the smooth occupation of Japan. 1
Actually, MacArthur reported to the Army Chief of Staff
Eisenhower on January 25, 1946, that:
No specific and tangible evidence has been uncovered with regard to the emperor's exact activities
which might connect him with the political decisions of the Japanese Empire during the last decade. 2
MacArthur added to this statement that removal of the Emperor would create the need for "a minimum of a million
troops ... for an indefinite number of years. " 3

These two

statements of MacArthur's are somewhat contradictory.

While

he asserted the Emperor's innocence in the first statement,

1

Herbert P. Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and
the Problem of War Responsibility," Journal Qf Japanese
Studies, 18(Summer 1992): 322-332; hereafter cited Bix,
"Monologue."
2

Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946. Volume
8. The Far East (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1971), 396; cited in Bix, "Monologue," 332.
3

Ibid.

7

he approved the opinion of the people who accused the Emperor of his conduct in the war even though MacArthur opposed the removal of the Emperor from his position.
By clearly understanding Emperor Hirohito's role in
the war, from the beginning to the end, we will also be able
to understand how the war came to its termination.

If it

had been Hirohito who started the war and ended the war,
there would be no doubt that he would have been able to
stop the war much earlier.

If he really had such power, the

next question would be what made him continue the war even
long after Japanese def eat became likely at Saipan where
Japanese forces were annihilated by

the United States armed

forces.

The Start of the Pacific War

On November 30, 1941, about a week before the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, Hirohito's younger brother, Prince
Takamatsu, tried to persuade his brother to avoid the war,
saying that Hirohito could do it before the Navy started the
offensive movement on December 1.

Takamatsu added that he

heard from the Navy staff office that the odds would be SOSO, or 60-40 in favor of the Japanese side.

~

Hirohito said

8

that he was afraid that Japan might lose the war.

Then

Takamatsu asked, "Why don't you drop the decision to enter
the war?"

Hirohito answered, "The military and the govern-

ment are now moving toward the war.
they have already decided.
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I have to approve what

In this statement of the Em-

peror's, he concealed an essential point.

For important

proposals and decisions, military leaders and government
ministers had to consult with the Emperor beforehand.

It

was almost like their asking the Emperor's approval to the
matters they proposed.

The Emperor was able to direct the

government's and military's policies by asking questions or
making them reconsider their proposals.

When he approved

his ministers' proposals, he said "Yes," or "Good," and for
the ones he did not like, he just ignored them with sheer
silence. 5

Tojo Hideki, Prime Minister from October 18, 1941

4

Fujiwara Akira, Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, and
Yamada Akira, Tettei-kensho. Showa Tenno "Dokuhakuroku"
[Full Investigation of the Emperor's "Monologue"] (Tokyo:
Otsuki-shoten, 1991), 67; hereafter cited Fujiwara, Tetteikensho.
All translations are by the author unless otherwise
indicated.
Fujiwara Akira, Yoshida Yutaka, Ito Satoru, Kunugi
Toshihiro, Tenno no Showashi [Emperor's History of Showa
period] (Tokyo: Shin-nihon-shuppansha, 1988), 42.
5

9

to July 18, 1944, has been considered as bad as Hitler and
Mussolini in World War II.

On December 31, 1947, he testi-

fied to the Tokyo War Crimes Court that "Japanese subjects
are not supposed to do anything that the Emperor does not
like.

It is more true with the high officials

tion."

in the na-

American chief prosecutor Joseph Keenan was shocked

when he heard this because this statement contradicted his
scenario of the war criminal trial.

He wanted Tojo to be

most responsible for the war and denied any possibility of
indicting the Emperor.

Keenan advised the Emperor's minis-

ters to pressure Tojo to modify his previous statement.
Tojo then said to the court on January 6 next year that
"Previously he talked about his emotion as a subject to the
Emperor, not the Emperor's war responsibility.

116

So Tojo

was forced to assume responsibility for the war, and to
sacrifice himself for the Emperor, and Tojo accepted it.

In

Tojo's statement quoted above, the words "supposed" and "the
high officials" are meaningful and important indicating
different types of men among the people of lower ranks who

6

Yoshida Yutaka, Showa Tenno no Shusenshi [Showa
Emperor's History of Ending the War] (Tokyo: Iwanami
Shinsho, 1992), 114.

10

might have acted quite differently from senior statesmen
like Tojo.
We need to see how the Emperor got involved in the
whirlwind of the war.

The Emperor appeared very happy in

the early part of 1942 when the Japanese armed forces sueceeded in their invasions in the Pacific and southern Asian
theaters.

Kido Koichi, chief adviser to the Emperor, re-

corded in his diary that on March 9, 1942, the Emperor, with
a happy and smiling face, told Kido that the Emperor was
amazed and pleased at the very quick victories of his army
and navy in the Pacific and Southern Asia. 7

He mentioned to

Kido after the fall of Singapore on February 15 that "Japanese operations are succeeding this way because we prepared
very well this time studying and discussing war strategies
and tactic.

118

Kido added that even at this time of felic-

ity, the Emperor did not forget to instruct Kido to think
about good timing for ending the war.

7

Kido Koichi, Kido nikki [Kido diaries], March 9, 1945
(hereafter cited Kido), cited in Fujiwara, Tenno no
Showashi, 85.
8

Kido, February 15, cited in Fujiwara, Tenno no
Showashi, 85.
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Objective of the War

At this time the Emperor revealed his objective in this
war saying that until the Japanese forces completely secured
and controlled the resources in Southern Asia, the Japanese
could not help but continue the war. 9

Kinoshita Michie,

attendant to the Emperor, heard him say on December 11,
1945, that Japan began and lost the war because of oil. 10
However simplified, this statement still conveys the Emperor's sense of justification and the inevitability of the
war.

Here the Emperor indicated that that the well publi-

cized slogan "Co-prosperity of East Asia" was a veil to hide
Japan's real purpose of the war.

Emperor's and Militarists' View of the World

To understand the close relation between the Emperor
and the military, we need to see how the relation between
them developed.

Herbert Bix points out that the Emperor and

Japanese militarists shared the same ideas about the world

9

Kido, February 12, cited in Fujiwara, Tenno no
Showashi, 85.
1

°Kinoshita Michie, Sokkin Nisshi [Court Attendant's
Diaries] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1990), 72-73, in Bix,
"Monologue", 325.
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after World War I.

They complained that Japan did not enjoy

equality in the world.

The complaints they harbored were:

the Great Powers' pressure on Japan to reduce its armaments
after the Washington Naval Conference in 1922; the United
States' rejection of Japanese immigration to California and
the whites-only policy in Australia; the abrogation of the
Anglo-Japanese alliance; the American obstruction of the
Japanese expansion in China. 11

Even though the Emperor did

not want the war with the United States and Great Britain
personally, his world view became the background of his
later acquiescence to the military adventures in the Pacific.
Contrary to the discontent of the Emperor and the military, the Japanese people in general welcomed peace
World War I.

after

In this Taisho period (1912-1925), the Impe-

rial government's control over the people was loosened, and
political parties developed.

Emperor Taisho, Hirohito's

father, was suffering from syphilis, and his physical and
mental conditions deteriorated.

One day he caused trouble

at an important Imperial ritual, which denigrated the au-

•
Kinoshita, Sokkin-nisshi, 211-12, cited in Bix,
"Monologue," 335.
11

13
thority of the Emperor by disappointing the people regarding
the personality of the Emperor.

When he was expected to

read an Imperial rescript, he began to make a telescope from
the paper for the Imperial rescript and enjoyed the view
from it for a while.

This story spread quite widely among

people because what they had expected from the Emperor was
quite different.

So when Hirohito became the Emperor after

his father's death, he wanted to restore the authority of
the Emperor.

For this task, he found the military leaders

more reliable and helpful than the politicians of the political parties.

Facing international and domestic difficul-

ties, the Emperor thought that the military men stood up
while the politicians were corrupt. 12
The Emperor thought that the Japanese invasion in Manchuria was legitimate because Japan had a large population
in a narrow land and Japan had been developing its power
quite rapidly.

So he gave ex post facto consent to the

Japanese military's advance into Manchuria, which the Emperor considered as a rural area. 13

12

Ibid.

uFujiwara, Tettei-kensho, 31.

However, he was aware

14
that the advance of the Japanese armed forces into northern
China would cause a clash with the United States and Great
Britain. 14

When he approved of the further southern advance

of the Japanese Army troops into Shanghai and Vietnam, he
was actually leading the nation into a collision course with
the United States and Great Britain, and the Emperor
Hirohito should have been aware of it.

Emperor's Strong Tie with the Military

In the final year of the war, one of the reasons why it
took so much time for the Emperor to depart from the Army's
position that the Japanese should fight to the last in the
Japanese homeland is that the Emperor was so intimately
related to the military.

It was the Emperor's military, and

its mission was to protect the Imperial System and promote
the well-being of the Japanese Empire.

In the early Meiji

period (1868-1912), the government designated three fundamental duties of the people: taxation, education, and conscription.

In the nation building of modern Japan, all

these three duties of the people were directed to the establishment of a strong army and navy.

14

Ibid.

Here, conscription

15
meant not just recruiting soldiers, but dedication of the
lives of soldiers to the Emperor if necessary, and education
meant to create and train young men and women who would be
willing to do that.

The result of the education was superb.

The military men came to proclaim that they would protect
the Emperor and the Imperial system by dedicating their
lives.
men.

In turn, the Emperor came to rely on the military
In the 1920s and 1930s, the more critical the situa-

tion became, the more the Emperor depended on the strength
of the military.

The Emperor's sanctioning of patriotic

actions of young, spirited officers provided in turn a hotbed for military adventurism, which later the Emperor himself had a hard time dealing with.

His attendant, Kinoshita

Michie, described this circumstance:
Because the military stood up under such circumstance, shouldering the frustrations of the nation, it was extremely difficult to check the
spirited young men who formed its core, even
though they acted recklessly without regard to
means.
For their reckless behavior appeared to
exhibit some common ground with the patriotic
action of freeing the state from deadlock. 15
The February 26 incident of 1936, an attempted coup d'etat

15

Kinoshita, Sokkin-nisshi, 211-12, cited in Bix,
"Monologue," 335.
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by young Army officers, was the first such disturbance the
Emperor had to deal with.

On that day, they attacked impor-

tant cabinet ministers and Imperial Palace ministers proclaiming that they would defeat the corrupt government officials who, they presumed, obstructed the Emperor's ruling of
the nation.

In those days, stringent poverty prevailed in

rural areas from the economic depression, and many of the
Army soldiers were from those agricultural areas.

In the

incident, the Treasury Minister Takahashi Korekiyo was
killed, and Suzuki Kantaro, later Prime Minister at the end
of the war, was seriously injured.

Some Japanese historians

assert that the Army officials of higher echelons who had
intended to establish a strong military government conspired
for the incident.

The Emperor suppressed the incident by

issuing a special Imperial order by mobilizing the major
Army organization.

However, the shadow of assassination and

coup by the military continued to haunt the government and
Court officials.

The central principle of the Imperial Army and Navy
was that the lives of soldiers were expendable for the wellbeing of the Emperor and the Imperial System.

According to

17

Army leadership, one of the Japanese advantages in the
fighting in the homeland was that Japan still maintained a
large number of human resources to spend even after war
materials and other resources became scarce. 16

It was this

expectation of the Emperor and Army men that dragged the war
on so long.

Kamikaze Suicide Attacks

The extreme example of the dedication of the soldiers'
lives to the Emperor was the Kamikaze Special Attack Force.
The first Kamikaze attack took place on 25 October 1944,
when five navy Zero Fighters, each carrying a 250 kilogram
bomb, plunged into U.S. warships and transports off the
coast of Leyte.

Encouraged by the results, Vice Admiral

Onishi Takijiro of the First Air Fleet hastily recruited new
suicide forces.

Army air force units soon followed suit.

Until Japan's surrender in August 1945, and especially in
the Battle of Okinawa, the Japanese employed more than 2,000
planes for suicide attacks.

2535 Navy men and 1884 Army men

were killed in these assaults on American ships.

16

Thirty-

Tanemura Sako, Daihon-ei Kimitsu-nisshi [Secret
Dairies of the General Staff Office] August 11, 1944,
(Tokyo: Fuyo-shobo, 1985), hereafter cited Tanemura.

18
four American ships were sunk and 288 damaged by these suicide squads. 17

The operation of these suicide attackers was

conducted under the full acknowledgment of the Emperor.
When he heard about the Kamikaze attacks at Leyte, he expressed an emotional gratitude towards the Kamikaze fighters: "Did they have to do to such extent?
courage and dedication from my heart.

1118

I admire their
The Emperor's ap-

preciation of the suicide attack meant his authorization of
this tactic in the ongoing war.

He and his followers per-

ceived that this way of suicidal offence was psychologically
effective against the American forces.

In the fall of 1944,

the Emperor still held the belief that if the whole nation
stood up in this spirit, it would be possible to gain a
victory.

On September 7, 1944, Hirohito announced at the

opening ceremony of the 85th special session of the parliament: "The enemy offensive is getting severer and the situation more critical day by day.

Now is the time to get vie-

17

Fujiwara Akira, Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, Showa
20 Nen. 1945 [Showa 20th Year, 1945) (Tokyo: Shogakukan,
1995)
112 •
I

18

Yamada Akira and Koketsu Atsushi, Ososugita Seidan;
Showa Tenno no Senso-shido to Senso-sekinin [Emperor's
Delayed Decision: Emperor Showa's Direction of the War and
His Responsibility] (Tokyo: Showa-shuppan, 1991), 370.

19

tory by using all possible means.

1119

This is the period

when the senior statesmen became more desperate about the
war situation, and some of them began to voice an extreme
idea of dedicating 100 million lives of the people to defend
the national polity, that is, the Imperial rule by the Emperor. 20

However, the idea of "one hundred million Kamika-

zes" ended up only as those leaders' wishful thought.

Hun-

ger, destruction of homes, and all other sufferings demoralized the people.

Tojo and Emperor
The Emperor's close relation with the Army leaders,
especially with Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, led to the Emperor's involvement in the war.

He detested former Prime

Minister Konoe as a person of weak will. 21

When Prince

Takamatsu, Hirohito's younger brother, tried to persuade
Hirohito not to rely on Tojo so much , the Emperor told his
brother that he would not hear the advice of an irresponsi-

19

Ibid.

20

rbid., 173.

21

Fujiwara, Tettei-kensho, 24.

I

174.

20
ble court prince.

Ironically, Konoe and Takamatsu were two

of the most prominent people who saved the Emperor from his
fatal decision to fight on in the homeland.
hand, the Emperor trusted Tojo significantly.

On the other
Kido said

that the Emperor preferred the Army leaders, especially
Tojo, because they were willing to implement what the Emperor wanted.

This feature was most remarkable in Tojo. 22

Even when people began to criticize him in the middle of
1944 after the repeated defeats in the Pacific, the Emperor
still kept him as Prime Minister.

A reporter of Asahi

Shinbun [newspaper] recorded a conversation between Kido and
Tojo:
Kido: Military and domestic situations are not
favorable for the nation. Have you ever considered resigning from the premiership?
Tojo: It is regrettable that people began to criticize
the government. However, since the Emperor's trust in
me is unfading, I should not resign. 23
The Emperor's trust in Tojo lasted even after Tojo resigned
from the premiership on July 18, 1944.

It meant that the

Emperor maintained the same perception and policy of the

22

Kido, March 20, 1946, cited in Yamada, Ososugita
Seidan, 127.
23

Yamada, Ososugita Seidan, 128.

21

war.

Yonai and Emperor
However, we should not overlook the Emperor's cautious
use of check and balance in the military and the government.
According to the Imperial Constitution, the Emperor was
supreme commander of the military and supervisor of the
government; even though he tilted heavily on the side of the
Army, he still maintained some check and balance in the
military and the government.

He trusted Navy Admiral Yonai

Mitsumasa greatly, a man who opposed

the Tripartite Pact of

1940 and reluctantly participated in

the military conflict

with the United States.

It was Yonai who confronted the

Army position of continuing the war in the spring and summer
of 1945 on the grounds that Japan had used up materials and
food to fight on.

During the war in Japan it was only Navy

men who could restrain the Army's will to fight on.

22
Emperor's Engagement in the War

Different from MacArthur's report to Eisenhower,

the

Emperor Hirohito was quite active in directing the war.

In

the way he was involved in the war, we see that the Emperor
was not forced to acknowledge what the Army did, but he
behaved literally as supreme commander for the Japanese Army
and Navy, if not an excellent one.

(1) Shanghai
Earlier in 1937, when the war with China spread to
Shanghai, while Prime Minister Konoe wanted to restrain the
Japanese advance, the Emperor earnestly encouraged the reinforcement of troops from Japan to Shanghai. 24

From the Em-

peror's earlier statement that sending Japanese troops to
Manchuria was no problem, but invading northern China would
cause troubles with Anglo-American forces, it is hard to
deny his responsibility for the war both in China and in the
Pacific.

If Hirohito and Konoe together had tried to pre-

vent further incursion of Japanese forces in China, it would
have been possible to reverse the tide toward the war.
Hirohito's everlasting pursuit of exploiting China for Ja-

24

Fujiwara, Tettei-kensho, 32.

23
pan's prosperity was in the background of his attitude toward China.

(2) Bataan
In early 1942, the Japanese forces in the Philippines
were attacking the United States' fortress at Bataan.

Impa-

tient at the slow progress of the campaign, with fewer
forces required to do the task, Hirohito frequently pressed
the General Staff Off ice to reinforce the troops and get the
work done quickly. 25

(3) Guadalcanal
Hirohito pointed out three times the problem of not
using the air power more extensively at the battle of
Guadalcanal (August 7, 1942-February 1, 1943).

The next day

after his third request, the Army sent the air planes to the
field. 26

(4) New Guinea
After the retreat of the Japanese armed forces from
Guadalcanal, Hirohito suggested that just retreating would

25

Ibid. , 70.

26

Ibid.

I

71.

24
not be good, and the Japanese should open new fronts for
offensive movements to engage American forces.

Yamada Akira

says that the Japanese campaign in New Guinea was at quite a
standstill and contributed to the prolongation of the war. 27
The Emperor's occasional messages of appreciation and
encouragement led the Army to give more attention and effort
to the campaign in New Guinea, yielding, in turn, neglect in
other areas . 28

(5) Naval Battles
After the annihilation of the Japanese troops (2,500
men) at Attu Islands on May 29, 1943, Hirohito demanded
naval engagements with the American ships.

Navy Chief of

Staff Nagano Osami responded that the Navy would soon obliterate American naval forces.

Since it did not come true,

Hirohito scolded Nagano sternly. 29

(6) Absolute Defense Parameters
On September 30, 1943, the Imperial Conference decided

'

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid.

I

72.

25

to set up new defense parameters in the Pacific.

The Em-

peror insisted on this occasion that "defense parameters"
did not mean that Japanese would defend only, but that they
had to attack the enemy whenever they found the opportunity. 30

(7) Recapturing Saipan
After the Japanese defeat at Saipan (July 7, 1944), the
Emperor asked the General Staff Off ice to make a plan for
retaking the island.

Even after Tojo told the Emperor that

it would be impossible, the Emperor persistently asked it. 31
This episode attests that the Emperor knew how important the
island of Saipan was for Japan's defense.

However, the

story also indicates his recklessness regarding the situation, the relative military strength of his side and the
enemy's, and the safety of his soldiers.

(8) Beating Americans at Leyte
The Battle of Leyte was fought on October 24, 1944.
For the advisability of this battle, there were vehement

30

Ibid.

31

Ibid.
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arguments among the generals.
vailed.

The Emperor's opinion pre-

He said that after beating American forces at

Leyte, Americans would be brought to peace negotiation. 32

(9) Landing Japanese Troops on Okinawa
United States armed forces landed on Okinawa on April
1, 1945, and rapidly occupied large areas of the island.
Hirohito was stunned, and suggested to Chief of Staff Umezu
that since Okinawa was so important, if the number of Japanese troops was not enough, Umezu should decide to send
reinforcements from the sea.

Yamada says that the Emperor

at this time ignored the situation at Okinawa: 1500 American
ships including 40 carriers and 20 battleships were surrounding the island, and 1600 American planes were engaging
in the air raid.

Yamada also says that the Emperor was so

impatient that he urged the Staff Off ice to take more off ensive tactics while the military leaders in Okinawa wanted to
fight a protracted war hiding in mountains and caves.
Yamada points out that the Emperor's confusing order was one
of the causes of the high casualty rate in the Battle of

32
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Okinawa that officially ended on June 23. 33

(10) Attack Yun-nan in China
After the collapse of Okinawa became clear, the Emperor
suggested Yun-nan as a new battlefront to damage considerably the Americans and the British.

Chief of Staff Umezu

did not consent to the idea, saying that Japan could not
supply materials to that area. 34

Emperor Wanted to Fight On

These are only a few examples that testify to the Emperor's involvement in the operations of the war.

It is

remarkable that even after numerous defeats, the Emperor
always demanded new battlefronts to fight.

Probably he

thought that it would demoralize the Japanese forces and
give momentum to the enemy if the Japanese only retreated
after defeat.

The Emperor believed that the Japanese would

win until early 1945.

It was obvious to the eyes of the

Emperor that the United States was materially far superior
to Japan.

Hirohito wished victory which was similar to that

33
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in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, that is, by concentrating all available resources (material and human) , the
Emperor thought that Japanese could inflict enough damage to
an important section of the enemy to open negotiations for
peace.

In reality, it was Japan that suffered far more in a

war of attrition.

Emperor and Military Matters

After the war, Hirohito wrote a letter to his son,
Prince Akihito, the present-day Emperor, telling him the
causes of the Japan's defeat in the Pacific war:
The Japanese emphasized too much faith in "God's
nation" and the spirit derived from it, and ignored the power of science. The Japanese underestimated the military strength of the United States
and Great Britain. Japan lacked competent military leaders such as Oyama Iwao and Yamagata
Aritomo, the generals Japan saw at the time of the
Russo-Japanese War. Military men, without a grand
view of the situation, just arrogantly advanced
forward. 35
Since Hirohito was quite free of any kind of criticism,
seems that he did not develop a habit of self-reflection.
So, while he accused others a lot, he did not talk much
about his mistakes in his direction of the war.
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Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 100.

It was

it

29

Hirohito who promulgated the spirit of "God's nation," and
it was he who insisted on continuing the war and supervised
military operations.

It was unfortunate for the Japanese in

those days that Japan did not have competent military leaders who could properly advise the Emperor in his involvement
in the war.

What Made The Emperor Continue the War?

After the watershed of the war, that is, the defeat at
Saipan, on July 7, 1944, the Emperor continued the war not
because he wanted to acquire new territory, but because he
wanted a victory from the Allied forces so that the Japanese
could end the war on better terms.

He feared that if Japan

surrendered to the Allies, the Allies would force the Japanese to accept unconditional surrender terms and to abrogate
the Imperial System. 36

The well-being of the Imperial Fam-

ily was the Emperor's, court people's, and government officials' primary concern.
Prince Higashikuni was very much concerned about the
future of the Emperor and the Imperial System because he
belonged to the Imperial Family.

36
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On January 18, 1945, he
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recorded in his diary his view on an American radio broadcast concerning the United States postwar policy toward
Japan.

The interesting point is that he noticed that the

American policy was modified to more generous terms:
According to the American radio broadcasting, we
know that in America people in various sections
are now discussing the postwar policy on Japan.
Before, there were opinions that asserted the
termination of Japan as a nation. Nowadays such
extreme ideas have receded, and discussions are
going on concerning what systems the Japanese
nation can take. Today's announcement goes as
follows: 1. Japan can exist as a democratic nation.
2. The Imperial System should be abolished.
3. Army, Navy, Air Forces should be dissolved.
4.
Those who were responsible for the war, and the
military cliques, should be punished.
5. Japan
should abandon Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, Ryukyu
Islands, and the Pacific Trustee Islands.
6. The
Allies deploy their forces at important points in
the Japanese homeland. Reading this announcement,
I think that we should not allow these things to
happen. We have to strengthen our defense. As an
Imperial Family member I should do my best to
protect the Imperial Family. 37
It seems that Higashikuni spoke here for the Emperor.

Early

in 1945, there was a belief among the Japanese that the
United States would not allow the Imperial System to continue in Japan if Japan surrendered, and Higashikuni pointed

37
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out that the American broadcast supplied the ground for
Japanese determination to fight the war to the end.

All

these terms sounded so harsh to the ears of the Japanese
that this kind of American broadcast just contributed to
solidifying the Japanese determination to fight to the end.

End of Japanese Military and Imperial System

Four years later, on December 20, 1949, Kido, chief
adviser to the Emperor, shared with an officer of the occupation forces his recollection of the Emperor in early
1945: :
The Emperor's idea was that he could not help
continuing to fight the war because he was afraid
that Japan would be disarmed upon surrendering to
the Allies. He often told me that a nation without its military cannot survive as a nation. 38
For Hirohito, a nation meant a national polity with the
present Imperial Family at its center.

From his experience

he was fully aware that in modern Japan the Imperial System
had been empowered and protected from internal and international threats by the strong military, and the Emperor stood
at the highest point in the military according to the Imperial Constitution of 1889.

38
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Family got further entangled with the war mainly by the
Emperor's active involvement in it.

At this stage of the

war, the end of the Japanese military seemed to the Emperor
to be the end of the Imperial System.

Konoe and the Emperor

During the war, Prince Takamatsu, Hirohito's younger
brother, said that it was only Konoe, former Prime Minister,
who could estimate the international, domestic, and military
situation objectively.

In February 1945, the Emperor sum-

moned senior statesmen one by one to hear their advice.
They were former prime ministers and chief court attendants.
According to the Emperor's memoir, while other statesmen
voiced ambiguous or optimistic views of the war, it was only
Konoe who stated a pessimistic view concerning the ongoing
war.

On February 14, Konoe told the Emperor to terminate

the war immediately.

The Emperor responded to him saying

that he had still to see the result of the coming military
campaign at Okinawa, for the Navy and Army were ready for it
with high morale.

According to the Emperor's dictated mem-

oir, it was Navy Chief of Staff Oikawa who promised the

33
Emperor a very certain victory in Okinawa. 39

Hirohito said

to Konoe that it would be better for the Japanese to ask
peace after a significant military achievement in a battle.
Konoe then said to Hirohito,

"I wonder if such an occasion

of victory will really visit you.

If it comes, it should be

early enough, not half a year, or a year later." 40

Hirohito

continued the war because he still believed Japan could win.
This instance of Okinawa reveals that the Emperor's erroneous conviction was primarily based on misinformation given
him by his military advisors.
At this time, the Emperor asked Konoe if the United
States had the intention to abolish the Imperial System.
Konoe answered that considering the opinions of former Ambassador to Japan Grew and some other American officials,
Americans would not eliminate the Imperial System. The Emperor then said that he had some doubt about Army chief
Umezu's statement that the United States would abolish the
Imperial System of Japan. 41 Even though the Emperor still
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followed the military line of continuing the war, and rejected Konoe's advice, the Emperor still paid some respect
to Konoe's opinion about ending the war.

In February 1945,

the Emperor came to the point where he wanted to know the
United States' intention regarding the post-war status of
the Japanese Emperor.
Iriye Akira, a historian specializing in United StatesJapanese diplomatic relations, points out the significance
of this meeting between the Emperor and Konoe.

Iriye says

that it was Konoe who told the Emperor on this occasion that
unless the Emperor swept away the fanatical elements of the
Japanese Army, Japan could not approach the United States,
Britain, and China about concluding the war.

Konoe thought

that it was the only way to save the Japanese domestic order. 42

When the Emperor was still thinking about winning a

victory by using the military, Konoe tried to persuade the
Emperor into reconsidering his relationship with the Army
elements who were promoting the continuation of the war.
His opinion that the United States would not enter into
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negotiations with Japan for ending the war if the Japanese
government did not detach itself from the Army pointed out
the heart of the problem in the Japanese process of ending
the war.

Even though this position was not understood and

adopted by the Japanese leadership as a whole until the
final days of the war, the fact that Konoe clarified the
center of the problem in the Japanese course of the war
was significant.

As long as the Japanese continued to be

controlled by the Army, the Japanese could not end the
war.

As Konoe had already suggested to the Emperor in

February, the Japanese were finally able to bring the war
to an end in August 1945 by refusing to hear what the Army
men commanded, that is, the retention of the Japanese
military and the refusal to have Japan occupied by foreign
troops.

In the spring and summer of 1945, the Japanese

leaders who intended to bring the war to its end found
that how the nation's army treated became the most
important issue.

The Japanese Army's resistance to peace

was motivated by its desire to save itself from
dissolution.

When the Imperial System and the national

polity became endangered by the continuation of the war,
the Emperor and the civilian government officials than
resolutely dealing with the tough and stubborn military
men.

CHAPTER II
THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN JAPAN
In early summer of 1945, in addition to repeated defeats in the battles in the Pacific and South Asia and exhausting campaigns on the Chinese mainland, the Japanese
were enduring severe air raids and serious food shortages.
Quite contrary to the government statements on radio broadcasts

and newspaper reports, the morale of the Japanese

people was actually deteriorating.

Some government offi-

cials and military men estimated that Japan would be unable
to continue the war in the near future.

Some of them were

even concerned that if the war continued, the Japanese government would collapse by itself from hunger and revolts of
the people.
Soldiers' Remains

A tremendous number of soldiers' remains from the Pacific islands and the China mainland were returned to their
homes.

At the same time, the government was deceiving the

people by saying that Japan had been winning the war, and
the war would soon end in a total victory.

On November 17,

1995, I interviewed a 60-year-old Japanese man in Hamamatsu,
Japan.

He said that he was an elementary school boy in the

last year of the war.

Since his father was a Shinto priest,
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he often saw a great number of remains coming to his home
for religious purification.

Even though he was a small boy,

he interpreted the announcements of the General Staff Off ice
on the radio that Japan was winning as false because he
thought that if it were true, he would not have seen so many
remains sent to his home.

In those years of the war, many

bereaved families felt the misery of war, and prayed for the
early termination of the war.

Air Raids
United States Air Force General Henry H. Arnold said
that American conventional aerial bombing had sufficiently
pounded Japanese cities before the use of the atomic bomb:
The surrender of Japan was not entirely the result
of the two atomic bombs. We had hit some 60 Japanese cities with our regular H.E. and incendiary
bombs, and as a result of our raids, about 241,000
people had been killed, 313,000 wounded, and about
2,333,000 homes destroyed.
Our B-29's had
destroyed most of the Japanese industries and,
with the laying of mines which prevented the arrival of incoming cargoes of critical items, had
made it impossible to carry on a large-scale war.
We had destroyed 10,343 enemy airplanes, compared
to the 29,900 destroyed in Europe. Accordingly,
it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no
atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the
verge of collapse. 1
If we inspect the nature of Japanese houses and residential
areas, and consider the very poor level of the Japanese air
defense system, we will find that Japanese cities in the
year of 1945 were far more vulnerable to aerial bombing than
1
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the cities in

Germany.

damage inevitable.

The Japanese housing made extensive

So Arnold did not necessarily exaggerate

the fact to promote the interest of the United States Air
Force.
In 1945, most of the Japanese houses were built mainly
of wood, bamboo, plaster, and paper.
able to incendiary bombs.

They were very vulner-

Also, Japanese streets were very

narrow, especially in urban areas.

Most of the houses in

cities stood side by side separated only by inches.

The

ratio of the area of houses against the whole area of the
region in the Japanese cities was from 40 to 50 per cent,
while in American cities it was about 10 percent. 2

So in

the Japanese cities, once a part of the region caught fire,
it would have spread quite easily and rapidly.
American B-29s, which flew higher than 10,000 meters
above the ground, were no match for the Japanese planes
which were made light to fly fast, and significantly, lower
than 8,500 meters high.

Japanese planes were lightly ar-

mored for this purpose, as was the case with the Zerofighter planes.

This was the reason why Japanese planes

were very vulnerable to the American attacks in the air, as
in the case of the Mariana Turkey Shoot of June 1944, in
which American fighter planes easily shot down their
Japanese counterparts.

2
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Japanese ones were capable of targeting objects only 5,000
to 6,000 meters high.
Also by the time of the start of the American air raids
on Japanese cities, a huge number of Japanese planes and
expert pilots were already killed in the battles on the
Pacific islands.

Above all, the Japanese military had not

fully prepared for an anti-air defense.

A man in Kokura

city told a representative of American Strategic Bombing
Survey that:
We were not def ended from the Allied aerial
bombings. This situation was the same all over
Japan. The government leaders are responsible
for the misery of the people from air raids.
They forced us to engage in the war. However,
they did not protect us from the aerial attacks. 3
The sixty-year-old man I interviewed told me that
during air raids American bombers freely bombed whatever
targets they wanted and he saw no Japanese planes flying for
defense.

He thought at that time that this situation was

not what the winning nation could provide for the people.
By the way, Japan was among the first nations that
initiated air raids on the civilians in cities.

For the

first Japanese air raid on a city, on October 8, 1931,
during the Manchurian incident, the Japanese Army planes
bombed Chin-chou in Manchuria.

From 1939 to 1941, the

Japanese Army air forces bombarded Chong-chin, the

3
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Nationalists' government capital, 195 times and caused about
12,000 casualties. 4

So the Japanese military attacked

overseas civilians and did not effectively protect Japanese
civilians from the American air raids.
Not only the Japanese Army failed to def end the people
from air raids, but also the Army destroyed Japanese
citizens' houses for its own convenience.

The government

and the Army gave the order to smash houses which were
located near the edges of factories, transport centers, and
military bases so that these installations would not catch
spreading fire.

Altogether 614,000 housing units were

cleared away, usually by members of nearby neighbor
associations working with ropes and hand tools.

One fifth

of all the housing destroyed by the war was lost in this
manner, sending more than 3.5 million city residents out to
hunt new places to live. 5

This data reveals the low esteem

the Japanese government and military had for the life of the
people during the war.

The military installations were far

more important for them.

After the war, British scientific historian P.M.S.
Blackett compared the air defenses of Japan and Germany
during World War I I in the book titled Military and
4

5
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Political Consequences of Atomic Energy.

He explained how

easy it was for Americans to use atomic weapons in the
Japanese air where the anti-air defense was almost
nonexistent in the summer of 1945.

On the other hand, the

German industrial and technological levels of producing
airplanes was much higher than their Japanese counterpart,
and Germans had a superb anti-air defense system. 6
Air Raid on Tokyo

The first major American air raid on Tokyo occurred on
November 24, 1944, with eighty-eight B-29s bombing the
Nakajima Airplane Manufacturing Company.

For the first

stage of the Tokyo bombing, only the military facilities and
factories were targeted.

However, from March 10, 1945,

civilians' living quarters began to be bombed.

From 0:07 to

2:37 AM on that morning, about 300 American bombers, that
took off from the air fields on Mariana Islands, dropped
189,590 large and small incendiary bombs in the area of 40
square kilometers in Tokyo from the height of 1,500 to 3,000
meters above the ground, about three bombs within the area
of one square meter. 7

Saotome Katsumoto, the author of the

book entitled The Tokyo Daikushu [The Tokyo Great Air Raid]
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quotes from M. Amline's account of the Tokyo air raid:
The Air Force specialists chose targeting areas
and estimated the expected number of deaths. As
soon as the order was issued, hundreds of planes
took off. Guiding planes dropped flare bombs first
to illuminate the targeting areas. Merciless
sorties of bombers arrived one after another, and
incendiary bombs were dropped to destroy the
industrial areas and surrounding residential areas
completely. 8
In about two and a half hours, within the area of 40 square
kilometers, 250 thousand houses were burnt down, 85 thousand
people died, 40 thousand were injured, and one million
people lost their homes. 9

The American tactics for this

attack was to encircle one area with flame by the use of
incendiary bombs containing napalm that caused fire very
effectively.

Then other kinds of incendiary bombs were

dropped to cause fire inside the circle.

The people inside

the circle ran toward the center of the circle only to
become a lump of charcoal. 10

The way the bombing of Tokyo

on March 10 was conducted is by no means accepted.

However,

it is amazing that the Japanese military and the government
allowed this kind of disaster to happen.

American crews in

this bombing mission reported to their headquarters earlier
in this attack that they did not see any Japanese countering
planes, though they encountered marginal shots from

8
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antiaircraft guns. 11

In the spring of 1945, the Japanese

government and Army were too much preoccupied with the
coming Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland and did not
devise any substantial measures to deal with the ongoing and
immediate disasters inflicted by the American attacks from
the air.

While the military was crying for one hundred

million suicides for the war in the homeland, the city
dwellers were losing confidence in the prospect for victory.

An Army officer's opinion, concerning the chaos among
the people after the Tokyo air raid, reveals the gap between
the situation of the people and the intention of the Army.
Colonel Sato Hiroo, Army Quartermaster, said on March 26:
The attitudes of people today are deplorable. When
they should do their best to prepare for the coming
battle with the Allied forces on our homeland, they
are just preoccupied with evacuating from Tokyo.
Train
coaches
are
filled
with baggages
for
evacuation, and roads are crowded with evacuees.
What a shame that people just think about their
life.
Government and military leaders do nothing
with this problem.
We, the Army and Navy, will
just do our best to win a victory in the battle on
homeland. 12
This Army officer's statement represented the total lack of
strategical thinking of the Japanese Army.

As Blackett

stated in his book, the aerial offense and defense were
very important features of World War II, as preludes to
landing operations, with its purpose of destruction of war
facilities to destroy

enemy war power, and destruction of

11
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cities to demoralize the population. 13

Without considering

any measures to defend cities from aerial attacks, their
crying for victory just revealed their irresponsibility in
the operation of the war.

People became more and more

suspicious of the statement of the government and military
that Japan was approaching its victory.

According to the

Strategical Bombing Survey, in June 1944, only 10 per cent
of the people doubted Japanese ultimate victory.

In the

spring of 1945, the number increased to 50 per cent.

For

its motivation, 34 per cent of those who doubted said that
they doubted because of air raids, and 28 per cent because
of the destruction of military facilities and continuing
defeats. 14
Hosokawa Morisada, Konoe's son-in-law and secretary,
depicted the anger of citizens in Tokyo in his diary:
Some Tokyo citizens who suffered the disaster from
the air raid protested the Army officers who came
to investigate the damage by a military car
splashing mud along the road and wearing fine
clothes: People shouted to the officers, "You, the
Army, make us suffer this way."
People were tired of the war, and they knew that the Army
was still insisting on continuing the war at the expense of
life and property of citizens.

The Army issued the order of

compulsory evacuation at will.

Hosokawa added a question to

his diary: "Did any other Army exist in the Japanese history
13
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that was so cruel as the present-day Japanese Army?"
Hosokawa also recorded the suffering of people in Kyoto and
Osaka areas from air raids.

He said that every street was

full of people who were evacuating and carrying things to
the countryside, and everyone he met said that he or she
hoped that the war would soon end. 15
On May 25, there was another large air raid on Tokyo,
which was less severe than the air raid in March.

The

Imperial house and Meiji Shrine, where the late Meiji
Emperor was enshrined, was burnt by spreading fire.
Watching the Imperial Palace burning and shedding tears,
Prime Minister Suzuki bowed for a long time, and later
issued a statement of apology to the Emperor: "We will
apologize to the Emperor for the burning of the Imperial
Palace by pledging that we will fight the war to the bitter
end."

War Minister Anami presented a request for his own

resignation because he was unable to protect the Imperial
House from the air raid disaster.

The Emperor responded to

Anami by saying that the Emperor would pardon him and asked
him to do his best to assist the Emperor in the very
critical time for the nation. 16

15
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Food Shortages

In the summer of 1945, the Japanese people became more
and more hungry from the shortages of food.

Because of this

dire food situation, some government and military officials
estimated that Japan could not continue the war into autumn.
Prince Higashikuni recorded on May 12 that a House of
Representative, Hirano Rikizo, reported to him that then in
May people were eating rice that was stored for use during
August, so in August there would not be enough rice to
distribute, and wheat production would decrease
considerably, so the food situation would become more and
more serious. 17

Before 1945, in Japan

industries and

agriculture were quite labor intense, that is, human skill
and a large amount of man power were indispensable in its
industries and agriculture.

After millions of men were

drafted to military service, the labor situation greatly
affected the agricultural production.
Fish is an important source of protein for the
Japanese.

It was put on ration during the war.

For the

adult man, it was 50g a day in April 1941, 36.5g in 1942,
10.5g in January 1945, Og in August 1945.
sugar was stopped in August 1944. 18

The ration of

This government record

reveals how the food situation deteriorated as the war went

17
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on.
With the scarcity of rice, any plants that were
considered edible were eaten.

On November 1, 1944, the

government issued a special direction to all elementary
schools in the nation that school children gather acorns for
food.

They were to be processed into flour in village

factories.

19

On June 14, attendants and servants at the

Imperial court ate a strange kind of flour that tasted
bitter and did not satisfy them.

The rumor that what they

ate was acorn flour spread quickly.

On that day the Emperor

suffered from diarrhea not because of acorn flour but from
fatigue.

20

On June 8, 1945, Marquis Kido feared the effect of the
food shortages on the social order:
So it has to be observed that most of these
supplies [foodstuffs] will have to be lost,
especially in small towns and villages all over
the country, since their antiaircraft defense has
hardly amounted to anything.
If this is correct,
the extreme shortage of provisions and food stuffs
that will sweep the country in the latter part of
this year and thereafter---in light of the
approaching chilly season---will cause serious
unrest among the people at large. And, in
consequence, the situation will be beyond
salvation21
Akinaga was Chief of the Plans Coordination Bureau.

His
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report to the Supreme War Council on June 6, on the Japanese
social and economic conditions staggered government and
military leaders including the Emperor.

Among the factors

that indicated the Japanese dire situation, he pointed out
the importance of the food problem.

He reported that in

certain areas of Japan, the possibility of starvation of
people was looming. 22

The participants in the conference

also felt the immediate problem of food shortage, since they
lived in Tokyo, where problems from air raids and food
shortage was most severe.
Since 1944, it became usual for the citizens in the
cities to go out quite often to buy food in the agricultural
areas, often with the whole family participating.
exchanged their belongings for food.

They

Including rice, some

agricultural food items were on ration.

So it was illegal

to sell and purchase agricultural products such as rice.
Prosecutors became so busy in dealing with this illegal
conduct of people that at some point they predicted looming
social chaos from food shortages in the near future.

23

Strict regulations of the life of people were the base of
the Imperial System that enabled the nation to engage in
war.

However, as air raids became severer and food

22

Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender,
(Stanford, California, 1954), 94.
23

Shiryo Nippon Gendaishi 13 [Sources of Modern
Japanese History], (Tokyo: Otsukishoten, 1985), cited in
Fujiwara, Showa 20.

49
shortages became more intense, the controlling of the people
was becoming more difficult.
Shortage of Oil
Oil shortages were not less serious than the food
shortages for the continuation of the war.
issue of securing oil had been important.

For Japan, the
This had been one

of the causes of the war between Japan and the United
States.

Now the scarcity of oil would become one of the

causes for Japan to cease the conflict.

February 6, 1945,

Higashikuni recorded:
The government is now in consternation after
finding that from now on no oil will come from
South-east Asia. For the substitution, the
government has just recently started to produce
artificial oil from potatoes. 24
Higashikuni added that the Japanese Navy lost most of its
power partly because of oil shortages.

He did not point out

the important cause of the oil shortages.

Japan wanted oil

from South East Asia, however the destruction of Japanese
naval ships in the battles with the United States naval
forces made it impossible to enable Japan to transport oil
from the south.

Also, U.S. submarines were intercepting and

sinking most Japanese merchant ships by early 1945.

For the

source of new Japanese fuel, Navy Chief of Staff Oikawa said
to Marquis Kido on April 5, that "As regards oil, we have
enough stock for six months.

24

And after that we will depend

Higashikuni, February 6, 1945.
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on the pine root oil."

On the same day Kido heard a similar

statement from Army Chief of Staff Umezu: "Though we are
most concerned about oil supply, we still have enough stock
to hold out for several months.

1125

These chiefs of staff

knew that without oil the conduct of war would be
impossible.

With the knowledge that Japan would not have

oil in the near future, they still proclaimed that Japan
should continue the war.

Since the Navy leadership actually

considered the battle of Okinawa as the Navy's final battle,
they almost used up the resources they had in Okinawa.

On

June 22, on the day when the defeat in Okinawa was reported,
Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa began to assert that since
Japan did not have sufficient materials to engage in the
war, the Japanese military was no longer able to continue
the war.

He predicted that Japan would plunge into crisis

around August. 26
Internal Crisis to the Emperor

(1) Konoe was concerned about the Japanese domestic
situation.

In February 1945, the Emperor invited Former

Prime Ministers and other senior statesmen to the court to
hear their advice concerning the ways to overcome the
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looming national crisis.

Among those advisors only Konoe

advised early termination of the war, because he thought the
chaos from the defeat after the Allied landing on the main
islands of Japan would give communists good opportunities
for social revolution.
Quite different from other statesmen, Konoe was
courageous enough to advise the Emperor to rethink his
relationship with the Japanese Army, especially the radical
elements within it, for Konoe thought that they were in the
core for the war policy of bringing to the fighting on the
homeland.

He said that he feared mainly the national

renovationists in the military, because a majority of
Japan's military men came from families below the middle
class, so it was easy for them to fall prey to communist
doctrine.

They tended to sympathize with the poverty in the

life of the people and a rising voice of labor.

Also, in

the military education, military men were inculcated with
the importance of "national polity", and Konoe thought that
communists would exploit this point by saying that "national
polity" and "communism" were compatible.
Konoe was also concerned that the enmity of the people
toward the United States and Britain increasing through the
bitter war would make them give more attention toward the
Soviet Union.

He was fully aware of the Soviets' efforts

"to establish Soviet regimes" in Eastern Europe and "to
promote the creation of at least pro-Soviet governments

52

throughout the rest of Europe". 27

From Konoe' s point of

view, it was desirable for Japan to cease the war
immediately and mitigate the suffering and anger of the
people because in this way Japan could avoid social
revolution.

As Prince Takamatsu once pointed out, Konoe was

the only person in Japan who was able to consider the
process of the war in the context of the domestic political
and economic conditions and the international environment.
While other senior statesmen generally yielded to the
Emperor's and military's rather optimistic war policies,
Konoe saw the military situation, and domestic and
international political conditions realistically.

His

primary concern was not necessarily mitigating the suffering
of the people, but rather defending the Imperial System.
Konoe's advice of February 1945 to the Emperor is important
in that he proposed a radical change in the Imperial
government's attitude toward the military and the ongoing
war with regards to the possibility of social chaos.
(2) Kido was worried about social instability.

Kido

was the most important person in influencing the Emperor.
He met the Emperor almost every day, and people stopped by
Kido's office in the Palace after they met the Emperor.
Konoe said once that to change the Emperor's idea about the
war, he first had to persuade Kido.
27
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Kido regularly heard reports from the national
intelligence off ice for domestic security to find if there
were any moves against the Imperial House and the war
efforts among the people.

So his opinion about the attitude

of the people toward the war and the Imperial throne was
based on real facts.

On April 5, when senior statesmen

gathered for discussions on the selection of a new Prime
Minister and the proceeding of the war, Kido reported to the
conference:
When the mainland is about to turn into a
battlefield, the internal situation is immensely
deplorable.
The nation has not necessarily been
cooperating with the government's administrative
policies but has been what we call "looking
aside." Even considering things like foodstuffs,
increased production, and peace and order, we must
form a Cabinet worthy of the people's trust.
I
should also like to call your particular attention
to the fact that antimilitarism has become rather
conspicuous lately. 28
Different from the government and military's slogan "One
hundred million people are determined to fight to death,"
this report indicates that people were tired of the ongoing
war, and some people even began to oppose the government war
policies.

It is clear that few people really wanted "one

hundred million suicides' war", and the more the government
forced the people to fight on, the more it alienated them
from it.

Undesirable results from the war, that is, a

staggering number of soldiers' deaths from the fronts, the
suffering of the people from air raids, and the situation of
28

Kido, April 5, 1945.
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near starvation, were awakening the people from a long sleep
of the forced bond between the Emperor and the people.

Even

though the people were inculcated since childhood that "To
die for the Emperor and the nation is an honorable thing,"
they gradually became aware of the ridiculousness of this
teaching, facing the evils of the war and recognizing that
the Emperor was responsible for the continuation of the war.
So, Kido was most concerned about the criticism against the
Emperor from among the people.

From the records of the

office of internal security, we can see what complaints
people at that time had:
If Japan were to lose the war, the Emperor would
be responsible, not the people. Whether the
United States or Stalin were to control Japan, we
the people do not care (arrest) .
The Emperor killed lots of sons of the people,
but he appears to be insensitive about the sorrows
of the people (arrest) .
Roosevelt and Churchill travel around the world
for the solution of the war. How about our
Emperor. He is making poems with his lady
attendants at the Palace.
If the late Maiji
Emperor had lived, he would have gone at least as
far as Taiwan (complaining letter to the Imperial
House) . 29
Under the Public Peace Maintenance Law of 1925, and the
revised one of 1941, the people were strictly prohibited
from criticizing the Emperor.

So, even though the number of

these cases was still very small, the fact that those who
dared to criticize the Emperor appeared, and the quality of

29
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the criticism was getting more serious was important.
Konoe also told Kido that he occasionally heard the remarks
critical of the Throne. 3 °

Kido and Konoe shared the same

feeling that the Imperial System was threatened not only
from outside but also within the nation.
(3) Army Officer Tanemura was concerned about the antiwar sentiment.

Not only civilian officials, like Kido and

Konoe, but also Army officers, like Colonel Tanemura, were
concerned about the antiwar sentiment among the people.

He

recorded that: "Anti-war, anti-military, and anti-government
sentiments permeate among the intellectuals.
of a period near the end of war."

This is a sign

This recognition of Army

men that people wanted to get out of war worked as a
demoralizing factor for them.
(4) Professor Nambara visited important people to ask
for peace.

Professor Nambara and his colleague, Professor

Takagi, visited

military officers' offices and the Imperial

Palace several times and offered their advice concerning the
termination of the war.

The Emperor recorded in his memoir

Nambara•s advice regarding the way to end the war.
Considering the fact that later the Emperor did what Nambara
recommended and what Nambara advised was reflected on the
Imperial Rescript for the termination of the war, his advice
was considered to be quite influential.
visited Rear Admiral Takagi's office.
3

°Kido, July 12, 1945.

On June 8, Nanbara
Takagi was Navy
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Minister Yonai Mitsumasa's secretary, and under Yonai's
command Takagi was studying the measures for the termination
of the war since 1944.

Nambara told him that:

If Japan plunged into the battle of "one hundred
million suicides" on the Japanese homeland, people
will get angry at the Emperor, for he allowed it
to happen. Also, if the Allies found that the
Emperor was not useful for avoiding bloodshed,
they would give up using the Emperor for the
purpose of pacifying the Japanese military men and
people. These internal and external factors would
eventually undermine the Imperial System. The
Soviet Union would exploit such a Japanese
situation for the opportunity to spread communism
into Japan.
I would rather recommend the Emperor
to proclaim that he would save the people from the
suffering of the war, and bring peace to the
world. Only in this way, he would maintain the
respect of the people toward him, and restore his
credibility in the international community.
Already the morale of the people was very rapidly
deteriorating. 31
Nambara stood between the people and the Emperor, and interpreted the mind of the people for the Emperor.
By the summer of 1945, already more than three million Japanese people died at the battle fields and homeland.
was already enough for the people.

This

If the Emperor had

forced the people to suffer more, the people would have lost
faith in him and begun to rebel against him.

The internal

crisis for the Imperial System was as serious as the
external crisis.
John W. Dower indicates in his book entitled War
Without Mercy that people ,in America during the war were not
aware of the crumbling Japanese situation.
31
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He says that
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many Americans were surprised when the Japanese surrendered
so soon after the atomic bombing. 32

If the American people

had known the fact that the Japanese people were suffering
from the agonies of the war, and the Japanese leaders were
considering an end to the war, they would not have thought
that the atomic bombing alone ended the war.

33
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CHAPTER III
JAPANESE CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET ENTRY
INTO THE WAR WITH JAPAN
Even though the May 8th German def eat was anticipated
by the Japanese leadership ever since the Allied landing on
Normandy, when it happened, they realized that it made the
Japanese war effort tremendously difficult.

Army Colonel

Tanemura wrote in his office diary on May 1st, "Even though
we are not surprised at the news of the German defeat,
however, the situation surrounding Japan has become very
serious.

Now we must fight against all the world. " 1

The

biggest concern for the Japanese after the German def eat was
whether the Soviet Union would remain neutral in the Pacific
War.

From May 11 to May 14, the Supreme War Council met

responding to the new international situation, and the first
and foremost agenda for the meeting was Russian problems.
The Japanese government and military leaders knew that the
Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty of 1941 was signed from
expedient and advantageous reasons for each side.

Once

Russians completed the war in Europe, they had no need to
remain neutral in the war between Japan and the Allies.
1

Tanemura, May 1, 1945.
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Japanese feared the Soviet entry into the war in East Asia
so much that if it were to happen, they thought that the war
would be over for the Japanese.
Tojo's Fear of the Soviet Entry
On July 18, 1944, when Tojo resigned from the
premiership, Colonel Tanemura recorded Tojo's biggest
concerns in the war:
The Japanese war situation would become critical
in two possible circumstances: when the Japanese
Navy and Army began to conflict with each other;
and when the Soviets began to join the war against
Japan. 2
Tanemura explained that even though Tojo was thought by the
people to be adictator, actually he was so subservient to
Navy leaders that he could not interfere in Navy matters,
and this was the cause of his fall from his post.

In the

same way Tojo had a fear that some day the Soviet Union
would begin to attack Japan.

Tojo was not the only person

who feared a possible Russian attack in the north; other
military and government leaders shared the same feeling.
There were several reasons to explain the Japanese fear of
the Soviets.
Nomonhan Incident
A Japanese Army division was nearly annihilated by
Russian armed forces lead by General Georgi K. Zhukov in the
battle fought along the Mongolian-Manchurian border from May
2

Ibid., July 18, 1944.
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to August 1939.

In the battle, about 18,000 Japanese Army

officers and soldiers died. 3

The main cause of this

disaster was that the Soviet Army was equipped with
mechanized modern weapons.

The Soviet troops were totally

different from the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.
The battle of Nomonhan left among Japanese military men a
sense of inferiority toward the Soviet Army.

One of the

Japanese officers commented that European nations that
fought World War I developed arms and means of war during
the war, while Japan was left alone keeping old weapons. 4
This fighting over a border dispute did not develop into a
war, but resulted in a neutrality treaty between the Soviet
Union and Japan in April 1941.

At this time, Japan had a

hard time in the war in China and had decided to advance to
South-East Asia.

The Soviets needed such a treaty, too,

because World War II had started in Europe and they had to
deal with the difficult situation there.

Learning a lesson

from this bitter experience, the Japanese military began to
modernize its weapons, though time and resources were not
enough for the Japanese to catch up with the level and pace
of the Russian and American production of arms.
Also, the Japanese Army maintained the mind-set which

3
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had become the cause of the failure at Nomonhan all through
the Pacific War.

At Nomonhan, in late June 1939, the

Japanese Army leaders in Manchuria ignored the words of
caution from Colonel Doi, the military attache in Moscow,
about the imminent Soviet offensive, on the ground that
negative views must not be allowed to dampen the field
army's ardent resolve to smash the Soviet-Mongolian forces
once and for all.

Alvin D. Coox, the author of the book

entitled Nomonhan says that it was apparent that the
Japanese army did not know and did not want to know about
enemy capabilities.

It tended to twist reality to fit its

preconceptions and could not or would not accept evidence to
the contrary. 5

In the Pacific War, the Army leaders

irresponsibly continued to make the same mistake.
Emperor's Concern about the Soviets
On July 22, 1944, Koiso Kuniaki and Yonai Mitsumasa
formed a cabinet after Tojo's resignation.

When these two

men visited the Emperor after the formation of the cabinet,
the Emperor told these men that they should never provoke
the Soviet Union so that Japan could concentrate on the war
with the Allies. 6

Considering the close relation between

the Emperor and Tojo, it is likely that the Emperor shared
5
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Tojo's opinion that if the Soviet Union were to enter the
war against Japan, the continuation of the war would become
very difficult, or impossible.
Why, at this time, did the Emperor and Tojo begin to
express their concerns about possible Soviet attacks on
Japan?

Already in the previous year, Soviet armed forces

defeated Germans in the Battle of Stalingrad and were making
great westward advances toward Berlin.

In June 1944,

western Allies succeeded in landing on Normandy, and they,
too, were advancing toward Germany.

The prospect of the

German def eat in Europe was becoming clearer to everyone in
Japan.

In the Pacific theater, the Allies had already

broken the Japanese absolute defense parameters, and in
July, the United States armed forces defeated the Japanese
forces on the island of Saipan.

The Emperor wanted to avoid

a two-front war that had sealed the fate of Germany.

Southern Sakhalin and Manchuria to the Soviet Union

Earlier, on April 29, 1944, Colonel Tanemura, the chief
of the Bureau for the Direction of the War in the General
Staff Office, proposed a policy for avoiding possible Soviet
entry into the war against Japan:
To avoid the war with the Soviet Union, Japan
should be ready to concede everything that the
Soviets would demand.
For that purpose Japan
could hand over to Russia these territories:
Manchuria, Liaodong Peninsula, Southern Sakhalin,
Taiwan, Ryukyu Islands, Northern Curil Islands,
and Korea.
For this purpose, Japan could return
to the condition before the 1894 Sino-Japanese
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War. Then, we can rebuild our nation again from
the beginning. 7
Tanemura was a leading planner in the Army for the battle in
the homeland.

He considered that the Soviet neutrality was

absolutely necessary for the Japanese fighting in the
homeland.

On September 15, 1944, Tanemura recorded that

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu proposed to the Supreme War
Council a great concession to the Soviet Union if it became
obvious that the Soviets would join the war against Japan.
Shigemitsu considered that the Japanese should concede
Manchuria and Southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union in the
worst case.

Tanemura advocated the Foreign Ministry's

proposal and commented that the critical war situation
necessitated such discussion as to future Japanese
concessions to the Soviet Union and possible peace
negotiation with the Chiang Kai-shek government. 8

These

concerns about the future Soviet attitude toward Japan
indicated unreliability of the Neutrality Treaty of 1941.
On September 18, only three days after this Supreme War
Council that deliberated the measures for dealing with the
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union sent a message to the
Japanese government refusing to receive a Japanese
plenipotentiary.

Tanemura commented in his diary that the

7
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Japanese had already lost their military power to back up
this kind of diplomatic activity. 9

Probably this is

Tanemura's private opinion in the diary about the futility
of diplomatic activity toward Moscow.

He pointed out an

important aspect of wartime diplomacy, especially when
dealing with the Soviets.

Actually, a proposal of sending a

Japanese plenipotentiary to Moscow arose again the next
year, and this diplomatic effort became one of the causes of
the delay in the process of ending the war.

This problem in

dealing with the Soviets reveals Japanese weakness in
coordinating military and diplomatic activities.
Stalin's Anti-Japan Speech

On November 7, 1944, for the anniversary of the Russian
Revolution, Stalin made a speech, calling Japan an aggressor
nation in the ongoing war.

Up to that day, Stalin had never

referred to Japan in his speeches presumably respecting the
neutrality treaty.

However, for the first time he talked

about the problems of Japan in the war.

This great change

on the part of the Soviet Union surprised the Japanese in
every field.

Stalin said:

Aggressors always prepare better beforehand than
the nations that are invaded. Reviewing the
Japanese first attacks at Pearl Harbor, other
Pacific islands, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the war
in the Pacific was started by Japan.
Japan, as an
aggressor had prepared far better than such peace
loving nations as the United States and Great

9

Tanemura, September 18, 1944.
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Britain. 10
Responding to this news, there were three opinions in the
Japanese government: First, Prime Minister Koiso should make
a responding statement.
should do so.

Second, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu

Third, the government should ignore it.

Then, Konoe's advice of no comment prevailed. 11
known why he advised this way.

It is not

In retrospect, it might have

been much wiser if the Japanese government had investigated
Stalin's real intention and the background of this speech.
The Japanese Army evaluated Stalin's speech quite
realistically.

Vice Army Chief of Staff Hata reported to

the Supreme War Council his estimation of Stalin's
intention:
We have been concentrating on the war with the
United States, and as a natural consequence,
Manchuria is today very poorly def ended against
possible Russian attacks.
Since Russia today
finds no benefit in the Neutrality Treaty with
Japan, it is no wonder even if Russia abrogates
it. Generally, for dictators, treaty and war are
two different things. We should not assume that
the Neutrality Treaty will continuously assure us
the security it has promised. 12
On November 15, just the day before Hata made this report to
the Council meeting, he had received news of an ominous
event that occurred on this day at a Siberian railway
station.

Lieutenant Colonel Kaneko, who had left Tokyo with

10
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11

Higashikuni, November 16, 1944.

12
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a new code, was found dead there.

Although his bag with the

code was returned to the Japanese embassy, the code was
probably copied by Russian intelligence officers.

Men at

the Army Staff Office in Tokyo were stunned at the news.
Since Hata had long been stationed in the Soviet Union, he
told his subordinates that:
According to the Russian way of dealing with other
nations, this blatant affair is the sign of
Russia's intention to sever diplomatic relations.
I have observed that similar things occurred in
the Baltic States before relations with the Soviet
Union worsened. 13
From his experience in Russia, he was able to predict that
Stalin

would abrogate the Neutrality Treaty.

However, in

these statements of Hata's, we do not find the measures by
which the Japanese Army would respond to the possible Soviet
attacks if they were ever to happen.
Response to the Yalta Conference

A summit meeting of three Allied nations was held at
Yalta from

4 to 11, February 1945.

In this conference,

problems related to both Germany and Japan were discussed.
However, the agreement by the United States and the Soviet
Union regarding Soviet entry into the war against Japan was
kept secret.

Because of the secrecy of this agreement,

while the Japanese harbored anxiety about possible Russian
attacks against them, they continued to try to ask the
Soviets to keep the Neutrality Treaty.
13

Tanemura, November 15, 1944.
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recorded on February 9, that there was a radio broadcast
which announced the news of the Yalta Conference of the
three Allied leaders, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Churchill, and
Stalin.

They talked about the occupation of Germany, the

economic organization to secure world peace.

Tanemura

noticed there was nothing about Japan in this broadcast.
The absence of the article concerning Japan puzzled the
Japanese.
On April 5, the last day of the Koiso cabinet,
notification was given by the Soviet Union that it would not
be able to renew the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty.
Considering this matter and Stalin's speech in November
which accused Japan of being an aggressor, Foreign Minister
Togo was suspicious about the agenda in the meeting at
Yalta.

So he instructed Ambassador Sato to obtain an

assurance from the Soviet Union concerning the Soviets'
intentions toward Japan.

Later Togo received a message from

Sato telling him that on April 27, Molotov assured him that
the attitude of the U.S.S.R. regarding maintenance of
neutrality had not altered. 14

Molotov told a lie to hide

the Yalta agreement with the United States.

His tactics of

deception were effective for biding time for the preparation
of their attack on the Japanese forces in Manchuria by

14
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keeping Japanese politicians and

military men unaware of

real Russian intention.
On June 7, Rear Admiral Takagi received a telegram on
the possible Russian entry into the war against Japan from a
Military attache in Switzerland.

It said:

At the Yalta Conference, Stalin offered
Roosevelt Russian entry into the war against
Japan, and Roosevelt accepted it not from urgent
necessity but for promoting the policy of
cooperation with the Soviet Union. 15
Takagi does not mention whether this message was
communicated to the Foreign Ministry, and other government
agencies.

It seems that the government and the Staff Office

did not pay worthy attention to this message from a Navy
officer in a foreign land.
Eastward Movement of the Red Army
Contrary to Molotov's "assurance", the Japanese border
guards were reporting a large concentration of Soviet Armed
forces in Siberia to the General Staff Off ice in early
April.

They observed that the Soviet Army began to

transport some divisions and a considerable number of planes
and tanks eastward in Siberia.

Tanemura recorded in the

Staff Office diary on April 16, that it was then necessary
to estimate the time of the Soviet entry into the war
against Japan and decide how the Japanese Army would
15
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respond. 16

Lieutenant Colonel Asai Isamu, Army Attache,

left Moscow on April 27, traveled all along the Siberian
Railway to Manchuria to investigate the transportation of
Soviet Army men and arms.

Vice Army Chief of Staff Hata

received his message:
I observed 12 to 15 trains per day carrying men
and arms of the Red Army to Eastern Siberia.
People appear to be starting a war very soon.
I
can tell that today Russian entry into the war
with Japan is unavoidable. 17
On May 14, Colonel Matsutani, who was appointed secretary to
Prime Minister Suzuki in April 1945, reported the size of
the Soviet forces on the Manchurian border to Matsudaira,
secretary of Marquis Kido:
In late June, the Soviets on Eastern Siberia
will have approximately 2,000 planes and 2,000
tanks, and in July and August, additional planes
and troops will arrive from Europe. We have no
means to avoid catastrophe from Russian entry into
the war. 18
Matsudaira did not necessarily consider this situation
pessimistically, but he thought that Russian threat could be
used as an alarm to bring home to everyone the necessity to
end the war.
Army's Response to the Soviet Threat
Tanemura recorded that on May 5, the Army Staff Office

16

Tanemura, April 16, 1945.
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drafted a plan for defending Manchuria from possible Soviet
invasion.

He described a split of opinions in the Army:

Some insisted that we should def end against the
Soviets by maintaining our forces along the
Manchurian-Soviet border, even if chances of
victory would be tenuous. Others insisted that
since it was likely that we could not defend
Manchuria from Russian invasion, we should retreat
as far south as the Manchurian-Korean border and
secure Korea, the important part of the Japanese
Empire.
Finally, both sides compromised and
decided that we would concentrate our forces in
the Southern Manchuria and engage in a great
protracted war.
Four divisions were to be
transferred from China to Manchuria.
Some teams
of troops have already begun to move according to
this policy. 19
Since this is a diary for the Staff Office, not for outside
readers, Tanemura honestly recorded the attitude of the Army
against the imminent Soviet invasion.

The Japanese Army

knew that in Manchuria they did not have enough strength to
fight against the Soviets.

The best parts of the armed

forces had been already transferred to the Pacific.

The Red

Army that had just defeated Germany was turned this time
toward the Japanese, and the momentum they had picked up in
Europe was still lasting.

It seems that by this time the

Japanese Army did not have any prospect of victory in
Manchuria.
Prince Higashikuni
In wartime Japan, it was not only military men who were
worried about possible Soviet entry into the war with Japan.

19

Tanemura, May 5, 1945.
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Prince Higashikuni, as a member of Imperial Family, feared
Soviet advance in East Asia.

He knew that communism is

incompatible with the Imperial System, and that the Soviet
advance and occupation of Japan, if it were to happen, meant
to the Japanese the end of the Imperial System.

On February

12, 1945, Higashikuni fearfully described the Soviet advance
in Europe:
In the morning, Arimatsu, an officer of the
General Staff Office came to me and said:
Presently, the Soviet Army has advanced as far as
about sixty miles east of Berlin. The German
factories in Silesia were confiscated by the
Russian forces without any destruction. The
Germans are concentrating their forces in the east
front and the Russians are sending reinforcements
to the west. They have already established
communist governments in Poland, Finland, and
Bulgaria, and had infiltrated into France and
Italy. The Soviet Union is now politically
conquering the entire Europe. 20
Higashikuni wrote this diary, worrying about the future of
East Asia.

Once the Soviets were to enter the war in East

Asia, the same thing would happen there.

The Soviet Union

was contiguous to Manchuria and Korea, so East Asia could be
tomorrow's "East Europe."

If the Soviets were to enter

Japan, the Imperial Throne would be far more in jeopardy
than in the case American forces were to occupy the Japanese
homeland.

By this time, some people in Japan, especially

people in the Imperial Court were probably weighing the
possibilities of Soviet and American landing on the Japanese
homeland.
20

Higashikuni, February 12, 1945.

72

Army's Response to Soviet Move

On April 18, Tanemura recorded that in the Army
Headquarters, Major General Nishimura walked around the Army
off ice busily and coordinated the opinions of the Army
concerning the measures for dealing with the Soviet move in
East Asia.

In this diary, Tanemura revealed that: In

Nishimura's first draft of the Army's
was an article,
the war."

basic policy, there

"Through the Soviet mediation, we will end

Then, after deleting it, the final draft became

"We will implement sweeping measures for dealing with the
Soviet Union."

Tanemura was not certain whether the

intention of the Army leaders was maintaining the neutrality
of the Soviet Union, or ending the war through the Soviet
mediation.
There was a background story to this hesitation on the
part of the Army leaders.

Two days before, on April 16, at

the Supreme War Council for discussing the basic war policy,
Navy Minister Yonai rather abruptly asked,

"Do we not mean

by the basic war policy today bringing peace to the war?"
The Army representatives only answered that the basic war
policy included important questions.

Since saving face was

very important to them, they could not tell the Navy leaders
that they were considering the termination of the war.

The

Army leader, General Umezu asked Prime Minister Suzuki to
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present a proposal regarding the Soviet continued neutrality
and cooperation in ending the war at the next meeting. 21

It

seems that Yonai tested the intention of the Army leader by
such a question, and he understood that even though Umezu
was contemplating the termination of the war, he was unable
to publicly announce his opinion, presumably considering
roaring opposition to the idea within the Army organization.
Konoe's Response to the May 8 Event

On May 9, the day after Germany surrendered, Konoe gave
a message to Navy Minister Yonai telling him that he should
consult with Prime Minister Suzuki and Marquis Kido over the
immediate procedure for the termination of the war.

In this

message, Konoe said:
If we change our policy from war to peace after
having Russian interference or after the
occupation of Japan by the Red Army, it would be
too late. Because in that case, Russians would
force us to have a communist government.
I am
most afraid of this point: The Japanese society
today with some chaos from the war provides
Russians with a good opportunity for communizing
Japan. 22
Konoe persistently voiced his opinion about the threat of
communism over Japan in the confusion from the war.

He was

a politician who was able to integrate domestic and
international political issues into his considerations.

He

had a strong sense that the central issue in Japan and in
21
22

Tanemura, April 18, 1945.

Takagi Sokichi, Shusen Oboegaki [Recollections of the
Termination of the War] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1948), 39.
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the world in those days was a threat from communism.
Konoe's advice struck Yanai quite significantly because he
later often talked about the social chaos from the war and
the necessity to end the war as soon as possible.

In 1917,

when Yanai was Military Attache in Moscow, he observed the
Russian Revolution, so probably he had a good understanding
of why, how, and when a social revolution would occur.

He

might have compared war-torn Russia in 1917 and Japan in the
summer of 1945.

Yonai's recognition of the need for the

early termination of the war was important because as Navy
Minister he could exert significant influence on the Army
for the reorientation in the Army policy of continuing the
war.

So Konoe made a right political move toward ending the

war in this new situation.
Umezu•s Inspection Tour in China

On May 28, the General Staff Office decided to
concentrate Japanese armed forces in Northern and Central
China.

The Japanese primary concern in the Chinese

continent shifted from the Chinese to the Russians.

In the

first week of June, Chief of Army Staff Umezu made an
inspecting tour in Manchuria and Northern China and returned
to Tokyo on June 9.

He reported the defence conditions in

Manchuria and Northern China to the Emperor.

Umezu's report

became one of several reasons the Emperor used in deciding
to end the war.

The Emperor's memoir describes his

interview with Umezu:
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According to Umezu's report, all the Japanese
armed forces in China today could be equal in
strength to eight American divisions. He said
that if ten American divisions land on China, they
would easily defeat us there. He had never before
talked like this without confidence. 23
This is a mysterious document.

The concern of the Japanese

Army in China and Manchuria in those days was possible
attacks from the north by the Soviet forces.

The Emperor

and Umezu might have discussed what the Emperor's memoir did
not reveal.

Umezu might have talked to the Emperor that

substantial part of Army forces in Manchuria were withdrawn
to the Pacific, thus the Japanese would not resist possible
Soviet invasion. It is unlikely that Umezu went to Manchuria
to inspect the defense against possible American invasion in
this region.

Furthermore, the Emperor certainly knew that

the Soviets concentrated more than one million troops along
the Manchurian border, which was more than ten American
divisions.

Yonai and the Army

Navy Minister Yonai was carefully watching the change
of the Army leaders, especially Chief of Staff Umezu and War
Minister Anami, in their attitude toward the war and peace
issue.

On May 14, he said to his secretary Takagi that:

... even though they cautiously keep silent, they
are very afraid of Russian moves against Japan.
They want the Soviet Union to confirm and extend
the Neutrality Treaty, and to play a role of
23

Terasaki Dokuhakuroku, 13 7.
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mediation in the war. They are recently losing
confidence in the war [in the Pacific and Asia] ,
and they want to end the war. 24
It seems that Yonai was referring to the battle in Okinawa
when he talked about the confidence of the Army in the war.
The Japanese Navy considered Okinawa as its final large
battle, and used up most of its power there.

As for the

Army in Okinawa, on May 4, the Army engaged in a large scale
counter offensive to recapture the bases American forces
occupied, but it resulted in a miserable defeat.

By this

time the prospect of the battle in Okinawa was bleak to the
Army leaders, and they were losing their credibility as well
as their strength.

The severity of the battle with very

high casualty rates both for military personnel and
civilians might have led the Army officials to estimate the
war situation more realistically than before.

In addition

to losing the war in Okinawa, the May 8th German defeat
staggered them even though they pretended not to pay
attention to the fall of their European ally, and since that
day the news of increased transportation of Russian armed
forces to Eastern Siberia was reaching the Army Headquarters
every day.

The plan of the Army for fighting with the

American forces on the Japanese homeland had been considered
possible as long as the Soviets remained neutral.

In the

first place, the Japanese military was able to fight the
Pacific war up to this day because the Soviets had been
24

Yonai Memoir, 107.
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engaging a difficult war in Europe.

The changing situation

proved that the convenient treaty for both sides so far was
becoming an empty promise.

As a military leader, Yonai was

able to see the factors which were undermining the Army's
confidence beyond its ostentatious slogans.
Togo and the Army

Togo Shigenori, Foreign Minister when the Pacific War
started in 1941, became Foreign Minister again on April 9,
1945, pledging to end the war.

He knew that the Army's

insistence on continuing the war was the largest obstacle to
peace.

However, he found a breakthrough to this problem.

He said:
Early in my tenure of off ice the Vice-Chief of the
Army General Staff, General Kawabe, called on me
with some of his subordinates and, explaining in
detail the concentration of the Red Army in
Siberia, requested me to do all possible to
prevent Russian participation in the war. The
Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral
Ozawa, made a similar request, as did also the
Army Chief of Staff, General Umezu. 25
From this account, it is known that the Army had no other
recourse than asking the Foreign Minister's help for
avoiding the Russian entry into the war against Japan.

It

is hard to understand why the Army and the Navy thought that
the Japanese Foreign Ministry possessed such power as to
stop the war.

Togo thought that this was a good opportunity

to move for an early peace by making "use of the desires of
25
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the military services." 26

Togo's objective was that in the

process of approaching the Soviets for the assurance of the
Neutrality Treaty, the Japanese would also ask the Soviets
to mediate the war between Japan and the Allies.

However,

Togo himself did not think that at this juncture of the war,
a diplomatic means would influence the war situation
greatly.

On May 16, Togo confidentially told Rear Admiral

Takagi that diplomacy with the Soviet Union had many
unpredictable elements, and in the ratio of 7 or 8 out of
10, Russians would not give the Japanese a favorable
response. 27

Togo's idea was that even if the odds were not

favorable for Japan, still trying to approach the Soviets
for the termination of the war would become one-step
progress toward peace because now the most stubborn Army was
at the table for the discussion over the subject of ending
the war.
Yonai's Work on the Army
To bring the Army leaders to the line of the procedure
of ending the war, Navy Minister Yanai played a role.

At

the Supreme War Council from May 11 to 14, though Umezu and
Anami agreed to the proposal of asking the Soviets strict
abiding to the Neutrality Treaty, and procuring further
Russian favor, for example the Japanese buying Soviet

26
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petroleum, they were reluctant to ask the Soviets' mediation
on the ground that the time was too early to do that.
However, at the Imperial Conference of June 22, Yonai
proposed to start the request of Russians' mediation,
considering the rapidly deteriorating Japanese domestic
conditions as reported at the Imperial Conference of June 8.
The Emperor showed a significant interest and asked the
opinions of the Army leaders, Umezu and Anami.

They did not

oppose, though Umezu said that the implementation of this
plan would need an utmost caution. 28

It seems that by this

statement Umezu was implying the problems of the young
officers in the Army who insisted on continuing the war.
Since Yonai had known these circumstances in the Army, he
utilized the authority of the Emperor with the cooperation
of Kido and others in order to have the appearance that the
Emperor urged the Army leaders to advance in the war ending
process. 29

Anami's Wish
When Colonel Matsutani traveled to Kyushu with War
Minister Anami in late May to inspect the defense conditions
there, Anami confidentially talked to Matsutani that he was
thinking about an early end to the war.

28

Yonai, Memoir, 131.
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In that case, Anami

80
could not tolerate the Japanese accepting miserable terms. 30
The Army leaders remembered the way the Russo-Japanese war
ended in 1905.

At that time, the American President,

Theodore Roosevelt, accepted the request to become a
mediator.

This time, the Japanese wished that the Soviet

Premier Stalin would mediate the war in the Pacific.

Just

as their operations in the war were not always based on a
realistic estimation of the situation, the Army leaders,
expectation of a diplomatic solution of the war was not very
realistic, either.
Also, their expectation of the mediation by Russians
was based on a misleading idea that the Soviet Union won the
war in Europe because the Japanese abided by the Neutrality
Treaty, and did not attack Russia during their war with
Germany. 31
favors.

This time, it's Russians' turn to reciprocate

This is rather a naive way of looking at the

international relations in war time.

Kase Had a Doubt
Foreign Ministry official, Kase Toshikazu, gave a
message to Matsudaira, secretary to Marquis Kido:
I have a doubt about asking Russians for
mediation. This is like crossing a dangerous

30
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bridge.
I think that theoretically the direct
negotiation with the United States and Great
Britain would be the best choice, but the Army
would not allow it.
So, I propose that as a trial
we ask the Soviets first, and see how they
respond. At the same time, we will prepare for
the negotiation with the United States and
Britain, and if the Russians do not respond
favorably, then we will shift to the negotiation
with the Americans and the British. 32
Considering what Togo and Kase talked about in requesting
Soviet mediation, it seems that this decision was rather
dictated by the domestic military and political
circumstances, that is, alternatives for the diplomatic
solutions of the war was very much controlled by the
Japanese Army's preference.

Just as the illusory promise by

the Japanese military of victory at Okinawa was broken by
American military force, the wishful expectation of Russian
help in the war was to be crushed by Russian military force.
Choice of Soviet Mediation
Then, why did the Japanese choose Soviet mediation?
The Army leaders thought that in that way they could save
the Japanese military organization from the possibility of
dissolution, because they knew that the American leadership
had been strongly proclaiming the punishment of the Japanese
militarists.

Generally, Japanese politicians acquiesced to

the idea that they could expect better terms through the
good off ices of the Russian government than by direct
negotiation with the United States and Great Britain.
32
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Emperor talked about the choice of the Soviet Union for
mediation in his dictated memoir:
The reason we chose the Soviet Union for mediation
was that we thought other nations were not strong
enough to resist the United States' demand of
imposing the unconditional surrender on Japan.
On
the other hand, the Soviet Union was a strong
nation, and we thought that Japan and Russia had
such a relationship as to enjoy the Neutrality
Treaty.
Since we did not trust the sincerity of
the Soviet Union in dealing with other nations, we
needed to proceed in this venture cautiously. 33
The Emperor was worried about the United States demand of
unconditional surrender because he thought that it might
include the abrogation of the Imperial System.

So he wanted

to resort to everything that would moderate these terms.
When he said that the Soviet Union was a strong nation, it
seems that he reflected his subordinates' expectation that
the Japanese could exploit the increasing U.S. and U.S.S.R.
confrontation, and the Soviets would need a neutral, strong,
and friendly Japan.
The Emperor's words of doubt about the sincerity of
Russians indicated his concern about the possibility of
Russian attack and advance in Manchuria and China.
Certainly he shared a fear of communism with such people as
Kido, Konoe, and Higashikuni who were intimately concerned
about the future of Imperial Family.

Expectation, doubt,

and fear were all mixed up in this Japanese venture of
asking the Soviets' mediation.

33

The Emperor continued to say
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in his memoir:
As the first attempt to approach Russians,
Former Prime Minister Hirota met Russian
Ambassador to Tokyo, Jacob A. Malik, with a deal
that if Russia exported petroleum, Japan would
concede to Russia such territories as Manchuria
and Southern Sakhalin. Since Malik did not give
any favorable answer to Hirota, I and the Japanese
government decided to send Konoe to Moscow.
Konoe
accepted this mission, saying that he would even
risk his life in this task. The Russian
government responded to this request of accepting
the Japanese plenipotentiary by saying that it
would decide after Stalin and Molotov returned
from the Potsdam Conference. However, Stalin did
not give any reply, only, after a while Russians
gave us the declaration of war on Japan.
In this
circumstance, we had no other way than accepting
the unconditional surrender. 34
Dealing with the Soviets was a difficult task, filled with
anxieties and suspicions.

In the first place, the Japanese

held a considerable suspicions about the Soviet intentions
and moves.

The Emperor and the government officials had

heard the Russian preparation for entering the war against
Japan.

Then, why did they continue to depend on the Russian

favor in ending the war?

The main reason was that the

leaders of the Japanese Army thought that this was the only
way to get out of the war with their honor maintained, and
that at the same time the Russian mediation of the war would
become the best assurance to avoid the Soviet entry into the
war against Japan.

Also, the Emperor found his own interest

in this deal with Russians.

Other goverment officials

considered that even though, for the moment, they yielded to

34
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the Army's demand of trying to procure Russian favor, this
was an important approach to the termination of the war.
When the Red Army invaded Manchuria, the Kwantung Army,
the pride of the Japanese Army, crumbled before the Soviet
armed forces, and the Emperor had to yield to the Allies'
demand of the unconditional surrender on the condition that
the Imperial System would be intact.

CHAPTER IV
DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE ARMY
By the summer of 1945, the Emperor and his chief
advisors recognized that Japan did not have the strength to
engage in a major battle with the Allied military forces on
the homeland of Japan.

Especially in early May by observing

the destruction the Allied forces had inflicted on Germany
and recognizing that the Japanese military had not been able
to resist the United States armed forces in Okinawa, they
thought that if the Allied forces were to land on the
Japanese mainland, it would end up undermining the Japanese
throne.

The Japanese Army as a whole insisted on fighting

to the last on the homeland, and imposed its plan on the
government.

Navy leaders Yanai and Takagi observed that

generally Army leaders were losing confidence, but young
Army officers maintained their posture to fight on, and they
controlled the atmosphere of the Army, and also the
government.

Though the military power of the Army proved to

be not sufficient to deal with the Allied armed forces, the
power was strong enough to threaten and police the opponents
of their war policy within the nation.
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For those who thought that fighting on the homeland was
not advantageous for the nation, it became important to
maneuver the Army men into their position.

Approaching the

Soviets was one of the ways they tried for this purpose.
Above all, the use of the authority of the Emperor was
considered by many the best and final way to bring the
nation to the termination of the war.

Then, a question

arises: Why did the Emperor definitely change his policy on
the war in June 1945?

Until that time, he maintained a

belief that the Japanese military would win some kind of
victory, if not a total victory, and that it would be
advantageous for the Japanese to achieve better terms.
Then, he came to want to end the war, because after
observing the results of the military campaigns in Okinawa,
he came to realize that already it would be impossible for
the Japanese military to reverse the tide of the war.
Moreover the surrender of Germany brought him to the reality
of the power of the Allied nations.

So, at this stage, the

Emperor began to approach Konoe's position that the
continuation of the war would not bring forth better terms,
but rather endanger the throne.
In early May, Kido reported to Konoe the change in the
Emperor's attitude toward the military.

Until that time the

Emperor insisted on refusing the Allies' demands for
punishing Japanese militarists and dissolving the Japanese
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military, because he thought that Japanese disarmament would
encourage Soviet advances on Japan.

Kido said to Konoe that

it took a long time for Kido to ''massage" the rigid
Emperor's position of depending on the military's pledges.
Even on this occasion of May, Kido was trying to persuade
the Emperor saying that considering the international
situation of that period, the weakened Japanese military of
3,000 or 5,000 troops was not enough for the defense.
Consequently the Emperor would no longer adhere to the
position of defending the Japanese military in the process
of bringing the war to the end. 1

Whether he wished or not,

the Japanese Navy and Army were crumbling internally for
their own reasons.

In this communication between Kido and

Konoe, Kido revealed that, probably from Konoe's influence,
the Emperor and Kido were aware of the American demand for
the Japanese disarmament, and that Kido had been trying to
persuade the Emperor into his separation from the military
as a means to facilitate the process of ending the war.
Also, if the Emperor had thought that the Japanese military
was necessary to defend Japan from Soviet incursion, and
then gave up this idea, what alternatives for the defense of
Japan from the Soviet threat did he and Kido have in their
minds?
1

1945.

Asking for the solid Soviet neutrality would be one
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of the answers.

Also, like Konoe, Kido was thinking of

approaching the United States.

However, before doing that

Soviet neutrality had to be tested.
Even though there was a change in the Emperor's
attitude toward the course of the war in May and June of
1945, why was he unable to end the war quickly?

Besides

the Soviet factor, we need to think about the relation
between the Emperor and the Army men.

The Emperor's

advisors, especially Marquis Kido Koichi, considered the
element of timing was important for such important Emperor's
order to the nation.

The memory of the attempted coup

d'etat in 1936 by young Army officers was still vivid in the
minds of everyone.

Colonel Matsutani Makoto wrote later

that during the last weeks of the war the question of how to
deal with the problems of the Japanese Army became more
difficult and important than dealing with the Allied
attacks. 2
Fighting on the Homeland

According to Tanemura's diary, the idea of fighting on
the Japanese homeland emerged when the Army Staff Off ice
decided to give up the land fighting at Leyte on December
19, 1944.

2

Even though the Japanese Army still held out in

Matsutani, True Story, 161.

89

the Philippines, the emphasis of the Japanese defense
shifted from the Pacific islands to the Japanese homeland.
As long

as the Japanese were determined to continue to

fight the war to the last, fighting on their homeland was
inevitable.
Those in the Army who planned the fighting on the
homeland explained the advantages of carrying the fighting
home.

Above all, enemy forces would have a much longer

supply line in the Pacific Ocean.

The Army planners

overlooked the technological advance in the American air
transportation.

In addition the Japanese knew the terrain

and climate of their home country; Japan still maintained
plenty of human resources, and the morale of the people was
expected to be heightened for the defense of their mother
land.

On June 6, 1945, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori

talked to Rear Admiral Takagi, criticizing these reasons the
Army planners enumerated for their strategy.

He mentioned

that the Army did not take into its consideration prevalent
destruction inflicted on the Japanese by the American air
raids.

Moreover, the morale of the people was

deteriorating.

The international situation for Japan became

worse, and diplomatic solution of the war became harder.
is interesting that Togo, as a seasoned diplomat, see the
war situation more realistically than the Army planners.
Probably from the long tradition of the Japanese military,

It
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the Japanese Army men had a tendency to consider the
military plan in terms of ground operation, and
underestimated the element of superior American air power,
which made a very long distance of the Pacific Ocean a much
lesser problem.

Also, it was possible that the Army men

admitted in their heart their weakness of not being able to
deal with the American air raids, but they did not do so,
because admitting their weakness meant to them admitting
defeat and losing face.
Takagi added the deteriorating situation in Okinawa to
Togo's opinion. 3

In this conversation, Takagi reviewed the

battle of Okinawa in relation to the planned battle in the
mainland of Japan.

If the Americans were to land on the

homeland, the disasters in Okinawa would be repeated in much
larger scale there.

On May 16, Takagi had heard from Army

Colonel Sato that the Japanese forces in Okinawa would fall
in two weeks, and that the planned battle in the homeland
would also become a very serious and difficult one. 4

Here,

Takagi indicates that there were some officers in the Army
who were seriously concerned about continuing the war after
the situation in Okinawa became critical.

Since the Army

plan for fighting on the homeland was already made early in

3
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1945, Colonel Sato did not say anything to oppose the Army
decision, but it is likely that in his mind the idea of
fighting on the homeland became more unrealistic after the
battle of Okinawa.

From the start, the Army plan of

fighting on the homeland lacked substantial conditions that
assured victory or safety of the people.

The battle of

Okinawa revealed to the Japanese what fighting on the
homeland would look like and what consequences it might
have.
Even before Okinawa, there were people who criticized
the government's and the Army's plan to make the homeland a
battlefield.

Earlier, on March 7, 1945, Admiral Okada

criticized Prime Minister Koiso's defense plan against the
future American landing.

He talked to Takagi:

Prime Minister Koiso says that if 10 American
divisions were to land on the Japanese homeland,
20 Japanese divisions will deal with them. People
are now laughing at his idea saying that he should
know how the Allied forces landed on Normandy.
Americans have air superiority, so they will
destroy our supply and communication lines
completely. Since we have many rivers, they will
destroy the bridges to obstruct the concentration
of troops. Even if we have 50 divisions of
troops, where shall we find weapons to give them?
Here and there, Koiso talks to people that we will
win, so they doubt about his sanity of thinking .
... A remark of Army Chief of Staff that the
battle in the Philippines will turn out to be our
victory is perplexing to everyone. 5
Prime Minister Koiso was an Army general, so his ideas
5
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represented those of the Army.

Okada, a Navy leader

questioned the rationality of the Army plan of fighting with
the American forces on the Japanese homeland.

Already at

this stage it was revealed to nearly everyone that the
Japanese military was unable to defend the people in cities
against the American air raids.

In the Army plan, it seems

that the Army planners interpreted "the landing of American
forces on the Japanese homeland" as the landing of American
soldiers on the Japanese land, overlooking the aid of
American air power.

Out of the 50 newly organized

divisions, 25 divisions were to be deployed in the trenches
along the coasts on the Pacific Ocean.

Many of the soldiers

in these trenches had bamboo spears, for only 700,000 rifles
and only 23 percent of the required number of machine guns
were available.

Only a very small number of officers who

were military school graduates were to train and direct
these new soldiers. 6

Just the number of troops, two

million, was astounding, enough to overwhelm the American
leadership in Washington, but the substance of the Japanese
defense for the homeland was amazingly poor.
In the spring and summer of 1945, there were various
kinds of episodes that exposed ridiculously poor conditions
of the Japanese defense against the possible invasion of the
~Teikoku Rikugun no Saigo (3)
[The End of the Imperial
Army], 150, cited in Tanaka, Dokyumento Showa Tenno, 144.
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homeland.

The Governor of Kochi prefecture, Takahashi

Saburo, talked to Marquis Kido:
In our area, newly recruited soldiers are
trained with cannons which are made of wood from
the scarcity of iron.
If the people hear about
this story, their morale will be weakened. 7
Kido told this story to the Emperor.

So probably this story

together with other similar reports to him contributed to
his reconsideration of the plan for fighting on the
homeland.
Japanese Navy leaders were well aware of the
anachronistic ideas of thinking of Japanese Army men who
remembered the days of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, when
the spirited soldiers fought the land war with the Russian
counterparts face to face on the fields of Manchuria.
However rational the opinions of these Navy leaders were,
they were not able to change the government plan of fighting
on the homeland.

The Army was still dominant having

millions of soldiers, and the Emperor was still on the side
of the Army plan at this stage.

From the spring of 1945,

such Navy men as Yonai and Takagi became more active
politically to criticize the Army policy, to lead it to a
more rational position, and together with Kido and Konoe to
influence the Emperor to the direction of ending the war.

7
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Emperor and Defense Conditions

There is an episode that indicates the change of the
relationship between the Emperor and the Army leadership.
On June 3, 1945, the Emperor sent most of his Military Aidede-camps to the beach called Kujukurihama [ninety-nine-mile
beach], about 40 miles south-east of Tokyo, for the purpose
of inspecting the defense conditions of this area.

As the

name indicates, this beach was very long, having a wide and
flat hinterland.

From the nature of the terrain and

proximity to Tokyo, it was considered that the American
forces would land on this area.

After the inspection, these

men reported to the Emperor that they were hardly able to
find any substantial defense in this area.

Since they went

on the inspection tour not long after Army Chief of Staff
Umezu reported to the Emperor on the satisfactory defense
conditions of this area, the credibility of the Army Chief
sank. 8

Also, Umezu had made another report to the Emperor

on the equipment of arms to the newly organized divisions
for the defense of the homeland.

Later the Emperor found

from the other source that in actuality many soldiers had

8
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neither rifles nor bayonets. 9

From these cases, the Emperor

found that up to that day he had been informed of only nice
things about the Army.

His order to his aides for the

inspection of defense conditions after Umezu's report meant
that the Emperor had begun to doubt about Army leaders'
account on the national defense.

These episodes signify

that throughout the war the information to the Emperor
concerning the operation of the war had been altered by the
military to promote the Army's and Navy's interests and
objectives.

The recognition of the Emperor that he had not

been always truly informed of the war situation motivated
him to reconsider the continuation of the war.
Anami's Inspection Tour in Kyushu

In late May, 1945, War Minister Anami traveled to
Kyushu to inspect the defense conditions in that area.
Kyushu is the southernmost island among the four main
islands of Japan.

The Japanese considered that if the

Americans were to invade Japan, Kyushu would be the first
target for their landing.
in this tour.

Colonel Matsutani accompanied him

What is curious about this tour is that Anami

was a person who persistently insisted on continuing the war
until the day before the ending of the war.

9

Ibid.

On the other
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hand, Matsutani's position in the Army was that he was
assigned to study about the time and measures for ending the
war.

After the tour, Matsutani informed Takagi that the War

Minister felt in the tour that the defense of Kyushu against
the possible invasion by American forces would be extremely
difficult. 10

At this time, Anami told Matsutani that he

would like to end the war if the Japanese were to be offered
favorable terms. 11

The fact that Anami inspected the

defense conditions of Kyushu in person, and had an
impression that the Japanese defense of the homeland would
become a difficult one is important.

In the last days of

the war, when young officers pleaded with him to pronounce
his position of continuing the war by refusing to give a
signature to the government document for ending the war, and
by resigning from the cabinet post, he decided to join the
side of peace, and after he was assured that the war would
officially end, he committed suicide.

In that difficult

time of his decision, the inspection tour to Kyushu might
have been one of the important factors for his decision.
One Hundred Million Suicides War

"Ichioku Gyokusai" is the original Japanese word for
the term "one hundred million suicides war."
10
11

Takagi, Memoir, 257.
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The word
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"gyokusai" literally means "a glass ball flying very fast
hits a rocky wall and splashes away in tiny particles."

The

phrase is used as a rhetorical and proverbial expression
meaning "If a person is forcefully determined without any
hesitation, and go his way on and on, he will do it."
The advocates of the Imperial System utilized the phrase as
a slogan to encourage the people to dedicate their lives for
the protection of the Emperor.

This idea was emphasized so

much that in actual wars the literal meaning of the term
took the place of its rhetorical use.

Many deaths of

soldiers in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and the
invention of Kamikaze-attackers were the examples of the
implementation of this idea.
In the spring and summer of 1945, those advocates of
fighting on the homeland actually thought of imposing this
idea of "one million suicides in the war" to protect the
national polity, that is, the Imperial System.

Lieutenant

Colonel Ida Masataka used a legendary story in the history
of Paraguay in South America when he tried to persuade
Lieutenant General Mori Takeshi into coup d'etat for
establishing a military government to prosecute a defense
war on the homeland:
In early 19th century, Paraguay fought a very
harsh war, in which the President of the nation
died in the battle, and the people died in the
fighting until the population became a sixth of
the original population. This is really an
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example of pride of a nation. 12
For Ida and his colleagues, this story was not just a
legend, but a scenario according to which the Japanese
should fight the war to the end.

For this kind of fanatical

idea not only these radical young officers were responsible,
but also many people in the government shared the idea of
fighting to death.

For example, Prime Minister Suzuki

Kantaro pronounced just before he became Prime Minister on
April 5, 1945 that "

today, we must, of necessity

continue the war at any cost," and he emphasized the
necessity "to die in action for His Majesty.

Japanese

Imperial wars were performed on the foundation of this idea,
expending the lives of soldiers and people for the Emperor
up until August 15, 1945.
Konoe's Opposition to Fighting on the Homeland

Former Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro persistently
opposed the continuation of the war, especially the land war
on the Japanese homeland, on the ground that the chaos in
society from the war would become a hotbed for social
revolution.

On January 22, 1945, he said to Takagi:

If Americans were to land on the Japanese mainland
and we were forced to engage in a guerilla
12
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warfare, it is the situation communists want to
exploit very much. If we allow this kind of
situation to happen, Japan will be in total chaos
and the national polity would be in jeopardy. 13
At this stage of the war, when most of the politicians
supported or passively followed the Army plan of fighting on
the homeland on the ground that only in that way people
could protect the Emperor and the nation, Konoe argued quite
differently.

He asserted that far from defending the

Emperor, fighting in the homeland would rather put the
Emperor in a dangerous situation.

The Japanese society

during the war was tightly controlled and regulated by the
government and the military, in other proper words, the
people were suppressed and forced to fight the war.

If the

American armed forces were to land on Japan and some parts
of the Japanese police and military powers were to stop
functioning, Konoe did not think that, in that situation,
all the people still show their allegiance to the military
government.

He had some sources of information which

indicated that in the spring and summer of 1945, there were
some people who did not hide their anger at the Emperor over
their suffering from the war. 14
Konoe was most concerned about the communists'
13
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influence on radical elements in the Army who insisted on
the continuation of the war.

On February 14, Konoe pointed

out to the Emperor that since the majority of the Japanese
professional military men "hail from families below the
middle class, their whole environment of life has been such
that it is easy for them to fall prey to Communist
doctrine."

So Konoe asserted that the earlier termination

of the war would be more favorable, and for this purpose,
the elimination of these radical elements in the Army was
necessary. 15
In spite of these concerns, in February 1945, Konoe's
advice did not change the Emperor's idea about the
continuation of the war.

However, it is not right to say

that the Emperor ignored or did not understand what Konoe
said.

At this time, the Emperor said that he had to still

see the result of the battle of Okinawa, for the Army and
Navy were willing to fight the battle.

He wanted to have a

victory before his government went to negotiation with the
United States because he thought that it would assure him
better terms for Japan.

At the same time, this statement

signifies that when the military had already begun to move
for the preparation of the battle, it would be hard for the
Emperor to stop the move.

15
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understanding the power of the Emperor in relation to the
Army between the Emperor and Konoe.

Konoe understood that

the Emperor had the absolute power over the Army, and he
should wield the power to change the course of the war.

The

Emperor thought that though it was supposed that he
commanded the Army, it was not always so easy for him to do
that.

As Konoe talked to the Emperor, certainly the Emperor

had power which no other person in Japan had.

The problem

was that the Emperor did not use the power to compel the
Army to move in the direction the Emperor wished.

Harada

Kurnao was a secretary to Saionji Kinrnochi, one of the most
influential politicians in modern Japanese history, and a
long-time advisor to this Emperor.
friend of Konoe.

Harada was an intimate

Later Konoe talked to Harada about this

February 14th interview with the Emperor:
I talked to the Emperor about my opinion of the
Army. He told me that he also thought that
something must be done with the problems of the
Army, and asked me what he could do to solve the
problems. I answered that since he knew best in
the nation about the affairs of the Army, he could
change the behavior of the Army by His Majesty's
decisive orders. 16
The February 14th interview in which Konoe's advice was
given to the Emperor is famous for its influence on the
direction of the war.

However, generally the focus of

interest has been directed by historians to the part of the
16
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conversation in which the Emperor insisted on letting the
Army and Navy fight the battle in Okinawa.

It is

interesting to find that on this occasion the Emperor
honestly talked to Konoe about the problem he felt with the
Army.

This conversation reveals a delicate balance of power

between the Emperor and the Army.

The Imperial Constitution

stipulated that "The Emperor has the supreme command of the
Army and Navy," 17 and "The Emperor declares war, makes
peace, and concludes treaties."

However, the real power did

not always come from the constitution, but from the person
of the Emperor.

A Japanese historian for modern Japan, Hata

Ikuhiko, says that in the days when the Japanese Army and
Navy were strong enough, there were some occasions when
military leaders ignored what the Emperor told them, and the
frustration of the Emperor accumulated. 18
In discussing the relationship between the Emperor and
the Army, it is necessary to talk about the role of Prince
Saionji Kinmochi as a long-time advisor to the Emperor
Hirohito before Kido.

In his young days, from 1871 to 1880,

Saionji studied European institutions and law in France.
Later in his political activities he maintained a liberalist
17
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and anti-military stance.

He said in 1937:

A military man cannot really understand such
matters as the welfare of a nation or a people.
Military men advocate national unity, but their
national unity is no unity at all. It just means
submission to them. 19
Even though he felt that the growing influence of the
military was a great problem for the nation, he thought it
wise not to interfere into what the Army was doing in China
in 1932, when there was a question whether the Emperor
should caution Count Uchida for his acquiescing in the
Army's aggression in North China.

He said:

If the Emperor cautioned him ... the Army leaders
... would blame the Emperor's advisers and me. If
the Army would not heed even the words of the
Emperor, it would greatly impair his prestige. So
it is a very delicate matter." 20
In this way, he thought that it was necessary for him to
arrange the delicate relationship between the Emperor and
the Army, weighing the power of the Army at the time.

He

died in 1940, at the age of 92, worrying about the future of
Japan.
Concerning the start of the Pacific War in 1941, the
Emperor recorded in his memoir that:
When my brother, Prince Takamatsu advised me not
19
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to enter the war with the United States, I said to
him that if I had not approved the war, the
military would have started a coup d'etat. 21
This Emperor's statement reminds us of Saionji's
consideration about what the Emperor could do when the
military was powerful.
Kido's Approach

Kido became the Emperor's advisor after Saionji left,
and like Saionji he cautiously dealt with the Army when it
was strong.

Even though he felt that the nation should move

on to the termination of the war in the summer of 1944, he
considered that before Japan decided to end the war, the
nation would need to be attacked by air raids and landing of
enemy troops to some degree so that the people would see the
necessity of ending the war. 22

It seems that Kido used the

word "the people" rather euphemistically, including the
Japanese Army as its important component.

At that time,

Kido thought that even though the war situation was not
favorable for Japan, the nation was still not ready to bring
the war to its end, especially since the Army did not favor
it.
So between Kido and Konoe, there was a difference in
their attitude toward the situation.
21
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For Kido, the Emperor
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had to wait for the good opportunity to arrive.

Since Kido

met the Emperor almost everyday in the spring and summer of
1945, it is likely that this attitude was also taken by the
Emperor.

On the other hand, Konoe said that if Kido and

Prime Minister Suzuki agreed to bringing the war to its
termination, and the Emperor decided in the same direction
the Army would follow. 23

After observing the defeat of

Germany, Kido began to move closer to Konoe's position.

23
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CHAPTER V
APPROACHING THE END OF THE WAR
In Japan, for those who thought that Japan had to end
the war, the retention of the Imperial System was becoming
the last thing they wished to defend.

After the German

surrender, in America, there were people who wanted to end
the war with Japan by modifying the unconditional surrender
terms, especially by giving the Japanese the assurance that
they could keep the Japanese Emperor.

Also in America, the

completion of the atomic bomb was approaching.

Those people

in the American leadership who knew the secret project of
producing the atomic bomb expected that the bomb would be
used to end the war early.

The Soviets were to enter the

war three months after the German surrender according to the
Yalta Agreement of February 1945, that was negotiated by
President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin.
American Intention Concerning the Emperor

Konoe Fumimaro, former Prime Minister, and others who
wanted an early end of the war had great concern about how
the United States would treat the Japanese Emperor.
Certainly, it was also the Emperor's concern.

For him, the

Japanese war effort was at that time no longer for the coprosperi ty of East Asia.

He continued the war so that Japan
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could end the war on better terms, that is, to preserve the
national polity.

Konoe understood this circumstance, and he

thought that to lead the Emperor in the direction of ending
the war, it was necessary to tell the Emperor the intention
of the Americans regarding the future of the Japanese
Imperial System.

Earlier, in February, Konoe pointed out to

the Emperor that "public opinion in America and Britain, on
the whole, has not yet gone so far as to demand a
fundamental change in our national structure." 1

Konoe

probably did not know that in America, in early 1945, most
of the people blamed the Japanese Emperor, and by "public
opinion", he meant the opinion of some important government
leaders.

Konoe's use of the words "has not yet gone" is

important because by these words he meant that "if the war
was to continue further, they would change their attitude
toward Japan."

So, he advised the Emperor that an earlier

ending of the war would be more advantageous.

After this

statement, Konoe talked about the fear of communism and
Soviet expansion in the world.

Considering this background,

it is clear that Konoe's plan for ending the war was by
direct negotiation with the United States.
After observing the defeat of Germany, Marquis Kido
Koichi, the adviser to the Emperor, became increasingly
concerned that Japan might share the same fate as Germany,
and that Japan might not be able to safeguard the Imperial
1

Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 47.

108

Household.

On June 8, he drafted a proposal in which he

stated that:
Though it would perhaps be a good idea to initiate
direct negotiations with the Anglo-Americans, who
are our opponents, it would be more appropriate to
have Soviet Russia, which is observing neutrality
at present, act as our intermediary. 2
When Kido proposed negotiation with the United States and
Great Britain, he said so because he perceived an indication
from President Truman's statement on May 8, that the United
States would only punish the militarists in Japan, and not
the Emperor. 3

The President's statement was as follows:

. . . Our blows [on the Japanese] will not cease
until the Japanese military and naval forces lay
down their arms in unconditional surrender.
Just
what does the unconditional surrender of the armed
forces mean for the Japanese people? It means the
end of the war.
It means the termination of the
influence of the military leaders who have brought
Japan to the present brink of disaster.
It means
provision for the return of soldiers and sailors
to their families, their farms, their jobs.
It
means not prolonging the present agony and
suffering of the Japanese in the vain hope of
victory. Unconditional surrender does not mean
the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese
people. 4
In this statement, the President did not actually refer to
the Japanese Emperor.

The future status of the Emperor was

still a controversial subject in the American government,
specifically in the State Department, even though tacit
agreement was reached between the President, Secretary of
2
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3
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War Stimson, Secretary of Navy Forrestal, and Acting
Secretary of State Joseph Grew.

The President's silence on

retaining the Emperor implied that he recognized the
difference of opinion concerning this issue in the American
government and among the people.

Another important feature

of this statement is that President Truman emphasized that
it was not the American primary purpose to harm the Japanese
people, and that America would rather like the Japanese
people to return to a normal, peaceful life.

This idea

became the base of the July 26th Potsdam Declaration.
Kido noticed that President Truman did not mention the
Emperor, but only accused the Japanese military leaders.
Kido's concern was not so much about the future life of the
people as about the future status of the Emperor.

Even

though Kido did not mention anything about the Army in his
temporary choice of the Soviet Union for negotiation, it is
certain that the choice came from the consideration of the
Army's strong request for saving its face.

Also, since a

certain section of the Army was listening to the American
radio (that was proved at the time of the Potsdam
Declaration), the Army men were aware that the negotiation
with the United States would mean considerable punishment
for the Army.
The Japanese leaders thought that asking the Soviets
for mediation was one of the options, and seeking direct
negotiation with the United States was still reserved as an
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alternative.

This point is important because it was not

necessarily the atomic bomb that caused the Japanese to
attempt negotiation with the United States on the retention
of the Emperor.

In the case that the Soviet route were to

be closed, the Japanese had an alternative plan to directly
ask the United States for negotiation, and for this move,
important figures in the leadership had already had an
inkling of how the United States government would respond to
Japanese requests.

They based their calculations on what

they learned from diverse sources of information, the most
important of which was the May 8th statement by President
Truman.
Grew•s Concern about the Soviets' Advance in East Asia

In considering the July 26th Potsdam Declaration, it is
necessary to see the events in the American government which
led to the necessity of such a declaration.

In the early

summer of 1945, some people in the United States government
and military began to voice their opposition to the planned
Soviet entry into the war against Japan.

General Douglas

MacArthur, Chief Commander of the United States Army in the
Pacific theater, requested the Soviet help throughout the
war, and Soviet Premier Stalin promised it to Secretary of
State Cordell Hull in 1943.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt

and Stalin reached a secret agreement on the Soviet entry
into the Pacific War at the Yalta Conference in February
1945.
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Acting Secretary of State Grew became concerned about
possible Russian infringement on the American interests in
East Asia in the event of the up-coming Russian invasion of
Manchuria.

Representing the State Department, on May 12,

Grew presented three important questions relating to the
Russian entry into the war and American policies in East
Asia:
1. Is the Soviet entry so indispensable as to
preclude political negotiation with Russia on the
American interests in the East Asia?
2. Is it impossible for the U.S. to re-negotiate
with the Soviets on the revision to the Yalta
agreements?
3. Can Soviet occupation of Japan be avoided? Is
it desirable to the U.S. interests in this area? 5
Grew's questions reflected the opinion of many people in the
U.S. government and military that the situation of the war
with Japan came to the point where the United States would
no longer need Soviet assistance to defeat Japan.

His

second question reflected the complaints of the people that
at the Yalta Conference President Roosevelt gave too many
concessions to Stalin in return for the Soviets' aid in the
war with Japan.

On the whole, these questions represented

considerable concerns of the American leadership regarding
the Soviet entry into the Pacific War scheduled three months
after the German surrender according to the Yalta Agreement.
Stimson answered these questions:
5
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. . . Russian entry into the war against Japan will
be decided by the Russians on their own military
and political basis with little regard to any
political action taken by the United States.
Stimson fully understood that the ulterior objective of the
Soviets' aid in the Pacific War was for them to retrieve and
acquire from Japan as much territory as they could in East
Asia, especially to reverse the victory Japan won at the
Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905.

So he indicated the

impossibility of the political renegotiation of the Yalta
Agreement.

As for the possibility of the Soviet occupation

of Japan, Stimson cited American "experiences with the
Russians in the occupation of Germany" and pointed "to the
wisdom of exclusive occupation" by American forces.

7

Relating to this matter, Stimson said in this letter to Grew
that American military strength in this area was enough to
defeat Japan alone.

Stimson probably meant that it would be

advisable for the United States at this stage of the war to
concentrate its forces on securing the earlier defeat of
Japan before anyone else would try to reach Japan. 8
In those days, Stimson was considerably concerned about
the development of the atomic bomb.

On May 13, 1945, the

day after Stimson got Grew's memo, in his diary he related
Grew's questions to the program of developing the atomic
6
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bomb.
These are very vital questions and I am very glad
that the State Department has brought them up and
given us a chance to be heard on them. The
questions cut very deep and in my opinion are
powerfully connected with our success with S-1
[the atomic bomb] . 9
In this diary entry, Stimson revealed a strong connection
between the Soviet problems and the expected American
possession of the atomic bomb.
Discussion on Warning Announcement to the Japanese
On May 29, Acting Secretary of State Grew called a
meeting of State, War and Navy Secretaries and their aides
to discuss a planned warning announcement to the Japanese.
It was Grew's idea that by giving the Japanese an assurance
that the Japanese could keep the Emperor, the United States
would bring the earlier termination of the war.
This idea was strongly supported by Secretary of Navy
Forrestal.

After the Battle of Iwojima, he investigated the

result of the battle on the island, and felt the necessity
of stopping further bloodshed.

Under his auspices, Captain

Zacharias was to begin a series of propaganda broadcast
toward Japan in the middle of May 1945, for urging the
Japanese to end the conflict. 10
Stimson recorded a significant diary entry about the
9
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meeting:
It was an awkward meeting because there were
people present in the presence of whom I could not
discuss the real feature which would govern the
whole situation, namely S-1 [the atomic bomb] .
. . . I told him that I was inclined to agree with
giving the Japanese a modification of the
unconditional surrender formula and some hope to
induce them to practically make an unconditional
surrender without the use of those words.
I told
him that I thought the timing was wrong and that
this was not the time to do it. 11
The matter of the atomic bomb was top secret, and knowledge
of it limited to only a few people.

From this statement, it

is certain that in Stimson's mind the atomic bomb and the
issue of giving the Japanese a modified surrender formula
were related.

When Stimson said that "this was not the time

to do it," he was thinking about the relation between the
timing of the perfection of the atomic bomb and the timing
of the modification of the surrender terms.
July 2nd Stimson's Memo to the President
On July 2, 1945, Stimson gave to President Truman a
memo which incorporated basic ideas for the Potsdam
Declaration of July 26.

In the letter to Truman that

accompanied the memo, Stimson mentioned that the ideas for a
warning to Japan were the result of the discussion between
Stimson, Grew, and Forrestal.

Stimson stated that this

warning to Japan would be revised when the efficacy of a new
weapon was proved.

11
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of a warning to Japan in the form of the Potsdam
Declaration, and the power of a new weapon would bring Japan
to its surrender.
The July 2nd draft of the proclamation which was to be
eventually delivered to the Japanese included the retention
of the Emperor:
The occupying forces of the Allies shall be
withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are
accomplished and there has been established beyond
doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible
government of a character representative of the
Japanese people. This may include a
constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty
if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the
world that such a government will never again
aspire to aggression. 12
The assurance of the retention of the Imperial System
reflected Grew's strong opinion that this clause was vital
for the acceptance of the proclamation by the Japanese.
Deletion of the Emperor Clause
The part of the proclamation that included the
assurance of retaining the Japanese Imperial System was
deleted by Secretary of State James Byrnes after he
consulted with former Secretary of State Cordell Hull on
July 16.

Hull said in his letter to Byrnes:

The proponents believe that this step
[modifying the unconditional surrender terms]
might shorten the war and save allied lives. The
theory is that somehow the influences and persons
12
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who listen to the Emperor and his religion would
fight and resist less hard and so save allied
lives and shorten the war, et cetera, etcetera.
Undoubtedly, if this undertaking should prove
successful it would be still more appealing.
The
other side is that no person knows how the
proposal would work out.
The militarists would
try hard to interfere. Also should it fail the
Japs would be encouraged while terrible political
repercussions would follow in the U.S. Would it
be well first to await the climax of allied
bombing and Russia's entry into the war? 13
Hull did not oppose giving the Japanese the assurance of
retaining their Emperor.

He did not believe that this

assurance would immediately make the Japanese lay down their
arms.

Certainly, the inclusion of the Emperor clause would

cause more vehement discussion in the Japanese government
and military circles than otherwise.

What if "the climax of

allied bombing" occurred while the Japanese were trying to
reach their consensus.

It would enrage not only

militarists, but also make the peace-minded Japanese change
their opinion about America.

Hull might have heard that a

new weapon would have enough power to destroy a city.

In

his memoir, Hull said that he had not been told by President
Roosevelt about the bomb, but "Occasionally someone gave me
a veiled hint." 14

Hull considered the possible Japanese

response to the warning announcement and the atomic bombing
more politically and realistically than Stimson did.

This

is also a question of how much and why the United Stated

13
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needed to use the atomic bomb.

If the Emperor clause had

been included in the warning announcement, and the Japanese
had been taking time to reach a decision for response, the
time for the Soviet entry into the war came anyway.
advantageous from the American point of view?

Was it

To Secretary

of State Byrnes, the answer was "no", because he did not
want the Soviets' ending the Japanese war.
Stimson thought that if the Japanese were to persist
after the warning announcement, the power of a new weapon
would be imposed on Japan. 15

As to Stimson's proposition,

if the Japanese had accepted the warning announcement with
the assurance of the retention of the Imperial System, what
would have happened to the United States plan to use the
atomic bomb?

Stimson said that the assurance of the dynasty

"would make or mar their acceptance." 16

This statement

indicates that if the Japanese were to accept the warning
announcement with the Emperor clause, and the war were to
come to its end without American use of the atomic bomb,
Stimson thought that it was all right.

Then, how about

Stimson's previous idea that the American interests in East
Asia vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was very much related to the
efficacy of the atomic bomb. 17

Considering his conditions
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might help to solve this question.

According to his

diaries, since he had such a serious health problem, his
medical doctors regularly checked his health condition.

He

was surrounded by men of strong character, so he was likely
to be influenced by what they said and what they did.

Grew

and Forrestal urged the inclusion of the Emperor clause in
the warning announcement, and Byrnes decided for the
deletion of the clause.
The Japanese and the Potsdam Declaration

Japanese Foreign Ministry officials received the
broadcast of the Potsdam Declaration as something that would
bring the war to its termination.

They had heard Zacharias'

broadcast time and time again, so they soon interpreted it
to mean that the United States was not opposed to retaining
the Japanese Emperor.
Minister Togo.

This became the position of Foreign

However, at that time, Togo believed that

the Japanese had to wait for the Soviet reply to the
Japanese request of Soviet mediation in the war, and he
stated this opinion in the cabinet meeting.
On July 27, Tanemura recorded in the Staff Office diary
two interpretations of the fact that the Soviet Union did
not join the July 26th Potsdam Declaration:
1. The Soviets did not join it because they would
need Japan as a friendly nation to them in the
worsening international situation.
2. The Soviets would soon enter the war against
Japan, and to keep it secret they did not join the
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proclamation. 18
Colonel Tanemura Sako wrote that since it was human nature
to take the easy way, the officers at the Staff Office
tended to think that Stalin was wise enough not to make
Japan his enemy.

Tanemura indicates that the Japanese were

considerably concerned about the intention of the Soviet
Union.
On this day, Tanemura participated in the meeting of
the secretaries for the Supreme War Council.

They decided

that they would just keep silent concerning the Potsdam
Declaration. 19

"Keep silent" meant no answer to the Allies.

Why did they decide to keep silent?

There were several

reasons: First, the opinions were divided among the Japanese
over the interpretation of the Declaration, the main point
of the controversy was whether the Allies intended to allow
the Japanese to keep the Emperor.

Second, the Soviet

position was not clear, and Soviet officials promised the
Ambassador to Moscow, Sato Naotake, that the Soviet
government would answer to the Japanese request of mediation
after Stalin and Molotov returned from Potsdam, and the
Japanese government wanted to hear the Soviets' answer.
Third, the Japanese feared that an open refusal would mean
further American air raids and an invasion of the Japanese
homeland as the warning announcement stipulated.
18

Tanemura, July 27, 1945.

19

Ibid.

Fourth,
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any indication of willingness to accept the Declaration that
proclaimed punishing Japanese militarists seemed to invite
the danger that young Army officers might move for a coup
d'etat.

What is remarkable is that the Japanese government

did not officially announce that the Japanese would oppose
the Potsdam Declaration, though the United States government
interpreted Prime Minister Suzuki's word

11

mokusatsu 11

,

meaning "ignore", as the Japanese refusal to the
Declaration.

This interpretation became the American excuse

to use the atomic bomb on Japan.

However, the order to drop

the bomb had already been issued from Potsdam on July 25,
the day before the Potsdam Declaration, and as we saw
before, the key figures in the American leadership had
already expected that the Japanese would not immediately
accept it.

The Army Staff Off ice
On July 30, at the Army Staff Office, in the
conversation among the officers, Tanemura felt that they
lost the morale to fight with Americans, and they expected
the Soviet diplomatic effort to solve the issue for Japan.
Tanemura got infuriated at their attitudes as army officers,
and shouted, "Isn't your duty to find the way to winning the
war?

Don't depend on others."

He wrote that he shuddered

with a complaint that "The Army headquarters with such
demoralized officers cannot lead the people to fighting on
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the homeland.

1120

The next day, Tanemura was ordered to work

at the Staff Office in Korea, and the diary ended on this
day. 21

The note to the diary says that at the end of the

war Tanemura became a prisoner to the Soviet Army. 22
The Atomic Bombing and the Soviet Entry into the War

The United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima
on August 6.

After receiving the report of the news on

August 7, Foreign Minister Togo met the Emperor and advised
him to act to terminate the war.

The Emperor said:

... We could no longer continue the struggle, now
that a weapon of this devastating power was used
against us, we should not let slip the opportunity
by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable
conditions. 23
However, no immediate meeting of the senior statesmen and
military leaders for the occasion of emergency was held.

It

was on the morning of August 9, when the Soviet Union began
to attack the Japanese forces in Manchuria, that the Emperor
told Kido to consult with Prime Minister Suzuki and to take
measures to bring the war to its end. 24

The question of

which event gave more impact to the Japanese in their
decision to end the war has been discussed.

20

Tanemura, July 30.

21

Tanemura, July 31.

22

Tanemura, Diaries, 308.

23

Togo, The Cause of Japan, 315.

24

Kido, August 9, 1945.

On August 12,
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1945, Navy Minister Yonai said to Takagi:
Though I do not fear either the Atomic bombing or
the Soviet entry into the war, these are the help
of heaven to us, because now we can end the war
without incurring domestic conflicts and
disturbances. 25
When Konoe heard the news of the Soviet entry into the war,
he said "This is the help of heaven."

Yonai and Konoe

thought that if the war continued, the internal disturbances
were sure to develop.

Even though on July 12, Konoe had

received a mission from the Emperor to go to Moscow as a
plenipotentiary to ask for Soviet mediation, in the first
place, it was not his original wish, for he held strong
anti-Soviet sentiment.

Considering Japanese fear and

anxiety about the Soviet entry into the war, it is certain
that the Soviet entry into the war gave a considerable
impact to the Japanese leaders.

In June, Togo said that

when the Soviets invaded Manchuria to enter the war with
Japan, it was the time of the end of the Japanese Empire. 26
The major obstacles for the Japanese effort to bring the war
to its end were removed when the Soviet attack on the
Japanese forces opened the way for direct negotiation with
the United States.

It is important to note that this

alternative had already been considered much earlier in
various sections in the Japanese government.

The elusive

wish of the Japanese Army and others to ask the Soviet
25

Yonai, Memoir, 153.

26

Togo, The Cause of Japan, 312.
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mediation of the war finally crashed.
One Condition or Four Conditions

On August 9, in the Cabinet meeting and the Supreme War
Council meeting for discussing the acceptance of the Potsdam
Declaration, Foreign Minister Togo insisted on just asking
the United States to let the Japanese keep the national
polity, in other words, keep the Imperial System.

The Army

leaders, Anami and Umezu, insisted on adding three other
terms: The Japanese disarm themselves; the Japanese try the
Japanese war criminals, and that there would be no
occupation of Japan by foreign Powers.

The addition of

these terms clearly contradicted the terms in the Potsdam
Declaration, which stipulated that the Japanese militarists
would be punished.

So the Army leaders actually wanted to

protect their organization, and others acquiesced.
the opposition arose from outside these conferences.

However,
Prince

Takamatsu, the Emperor's younger son, telephoned to Kido
"fearing that the Allied powers might take our conditional
acceptance as a refusal. " 27

Then, Shigemitsu Mamoru,

Foreign Minister until April, 1945, visited Kido's office to
tell him that "a rupture would be inevitable if we should
lay down the four conditions."

After Kido obtained the

Emperor's approval, the Emperor told Prime Minister Suzuki
to convene an Imperial Conference.

27

Kido, August 9, 1945.

From 11:50PM to 2:20AM,
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the Conference was held in the Emperor's presence.

There,

the Emperor presented his judgement to accept the Potsdam
Declaration on the condition that the preservation of the
Imperial dynasty and the right of sovereignty of the Emperor
be acknowledged. 28
The Emperor, Subject to the Supreme Commander

On August 12, the Japanese government received the
American reply that was written by Secretary of State James
Byrnes.

Paragraph 2, and paragraph 5, then became

controversial within the government.
From the moment of surrender, the authority of the
Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the
state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of
the Allied powers, who will take such steps as he
deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.
The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in
accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be
established by the freely expressed will of the
Japanese people. 29
The Army leaders again opposed these terms interpreting the
term "subject" as "enslaved".

In the Army headquarters,

these leaders were actually hearing vehement protests of
young officers who opposed the Potsdam Declaration in the
first place.

These opponents asserted that the second

paragraph denied the national polity of Japan.

The

democratic idea in this paragraph was quite foreign to the
Japanese in those days, especially to the Army men, because
28

Ibid.

29

Togo, The Cause of Japan, 324.
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of the kind of education they received.
Kido heard Prime Minister Suzuki begin to take a
position that these two paragraphs would not guarantee the
future status of the Emperor.

Suzuki had a tendency since

he took his office to cater to the demand of the Army men.
He later claimed that by a posture of compromising with the
Army, he tried to avoid its attempt of resorting to a coup
d'etat.

Also, since he was a survivor in the attempted

assassination in the February 26th incident in 1936, he was
considerably carefull in dealing with the Army men.

In

persuading Prime Minister Suzuki, Kido told Suzuki that:
if we do not take an immediate action now to
terminate the war, twenty million people will die.
If we take a necessary action now, only several
people will probably die; me, you, and a few
others. 30
Kido and Suzuki decided to use the Emperor's decision to
accept the American terms.

On the night of August 14-15,

Kido was searched in the Imperial Palace by the Army rebels
who rose to attempt a coup d'etat, and Suzuki's official
residence and private home were assaulted and burned by
other rebels.
On August 14, the Emperor convened the Imperial
Conference and he announced his decision to accept the
American terms for the Japanese surrender on the ground that
he was convinced of the United States' intention to keep the
30

Hando Kazutoshi, Nihon no Ichiban Nagai Hi. [Japan's
Longest Day] (revised edition) (Tokyo: Bungeishunjusha,
1995), 43; Shoda, History of Statesmen, 382.

126

Japanese Imperial System and he had confidence that the
Japanese people would support the Emperor.

On that evening,

the Foreign Ministry officials sent the message of
acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, and the next day, on
August 15, the Emperor announced to the Japanese people by a
radio broadcast that Japan would end the war.

CONCLUSION
In the summer of 1945, the Japanese no longer possessed
strength to engage in a battle on the home land.

The

government and the military claimed that the Japanese would
engage in a 100 million suicides war, if the Americans were
to land on the Japanese homeland.

However, this was

propaganda without any substance.

Many Japanese people were

hungry and busy seeking food.

The morale of the people was

rapidly deteriorating mainly because of the devastating air
raids.

Though the Army claimed that it had two million

troops in the home islands, there were only about 700,000
rifles, and many actually would be requested to fight with
bamboo spears.

The Emperor mentioned that the war started

because of oil, and the nation had to end the war because of
the scarcity of oil.

Though he simplified the situation, he

pointed that Japan could not continue the war because of the
scacity of materials.

The loss of Japanese control of the

sea and air increased American blockade of the Japanese
homeland and contributed to the further scarcity of
materials.
The May 8th German surrender and the Japanese defeat at
Okinawa in June showed the Japanese what it would be like if
the United States armed forces landed on the Japanese
mainland.

Contrary to its previous pledge, many now

believed that the Japanese military was unable to defend the
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island and the people.

Rather, even after the defeat in

Okinawa became clear in early May, the Army kept fighting
until June 23, thus becoming responsible for approximately
150,000 civilian deaths.

The Army lost its credibility.

In the homeland of Japan, the army had already revealed its
inability to defend the people against the American air
raids, though they did not reveal their weakness so that
they would not lose face.

War Minister Anami's attempt to

resign from his post because he was unable to def end the
Imperial Palace from air raid signified the seriousness of
the problem of air raids in general.

The Emperor discovered

that the previous Army Chief's report on defense conditions
was false after sending his own military attendants to
investigate the same areas.

The investigation also revealed

the dangerously low level of military strength of Japan at
the time.
The May 8th German defeat increased Japanese concern
about possible Soviet entry into the war against Japan.
The Army Chief's report on defense conditions in Manchuria
stunned the Emperor.

Men and arms had been drained from

Manchuria to the Pacific, resulting from the severity of the
Pacific War and the Japanese reliance on the Neutrality
Treaty with the Soviet Union.

If the Soviets were to invade

Manchuria, it was feared by the Japanese that it would turn
out to be a corridor for the Soviets' southern advance
toward Japan.

Diplomatic negotiation with the Soviet Union

129
to ask for continued Soviet neutrality and Soviet mediation
in the Pacific War became an urgent task for the Japanese
government.

The Japanese government decided to ask the

Soviets to abide by the treaty and mediate in the Pacific
War.

That was the major desire of the Army leaders.

The

Army and Navy leadership came to a point where many of them
wanted to end the war by the time of the Japanese def eat in
Okinawa.

The Army leaders thought that in that way they

could end the war without losing face.

Others in the

Japanese leadership acquiesced, thinking it to be the way to
bring the Army to the road toward ending the war, though
many of them had the alternative plan of asking for direct
negotiation with the United States if the Soviet route was
closed.
The retention of the Japanese Emperor was a focal point
for the United States and Japan in bringing the war to the
end.

The Japanese government proclaimed that the Japanese

would fight to the end to achieve this objective, though
they no longer had substantial will and power in the nation.
Through these propaganda actions, the Japanese expected a
political gain.

In the early summer of 1945, some important

figures in the American government began to think that it
was advisable to end the war by allowing the Japanese to
retain the Emperor.

This matter finally materialized

between the United States government and Japanese
government.

In the meantime, the United States dropped the
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atomic bomb on Hiroshima and the Soviet Union invaded
Manchuria.
There are diverse opinions about how the Pacific War
came to its end.

To say that "The United States' dropping

the atomic bomb ended the war," is too simplistic.

This

statement overlooks many other factors, especially the human
factors, that contributed to the termination of the war.
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